

## **Economic Marginalisation of Peasants and Fishermen Due to Urban Expansion: The JNP Project of New Bombay, India**

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The Central and State Governments in India have actively intervened in redefining land use pattern, often to the detriment of the peasant cultivators. In most situations, the real beneficiaries were the speculators, developers, builders, bureaucrats, and the planning and executing body. The case of New Bombay is a classic example of state intervention that completely redefined the relationship between land and peasant-cultivators. The New Bombay project acquired large amounts of agricultural and saltpan land from peasants in 95 villages for meagre cash compensation. The objective of the paper is to trace the origin of the idea—for the creation of New Bombay and a port to attract people and industry so as to decongest Bombay—and assess the condition of peasants who had lost land to the project. The study shows that the port, like most other modern industrial projects, seriously undermined the economic position of a large number of households. The small and marginal farmers and the fishermen were seriously affected due to others' land acquisition and their own loss of access to the sea, as well as denial of employment in the project. The project also failed to assess the skills and capacities of the affected people and facilitate them to engage in alternative productive activities. Women were productively engaged in agriculture, saltpan- and fishing-related activities in the affected villages. The loss of land and access to the sea have led to a greater degree of pauperisation of women, and increasingly confined them to the margins of the labour market.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The study of land and property in urban areas involves many agents: owner, speculator, developer, banker, real estate agent, consumer, and planner. The behaviour of land owners is different from all other actors. For the owner, land may be the source of livelihood; while for all other agents, land is purely an element for speculation and profit. The relationship between owner and land is often determined by agents other than the owner himself/herself. The State and the planners have played an active role in redefining the use of land and the relationship between the land and the owner. Public investment in land is made due to its direct and indirect effect on economic growth. Basically, the purpose of public investment is to create conditions

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for the reproduction of labour power, economic restructuring, and capital accumulation [Lojkine (1976); Edel (1972); Roweis and Scott (1982); Massey (1984); Warde (1988) and Haila (1991)]. The assemblage of parcels of land, the coordination of land uses, investment in infrastructures, public services, and renewal projects serve the needs of the economy and, thus, the interests of different groups. The action of an agent is orientated to future use, and the anticipated needs dictate the forms of activity. Haila (1991), while developing typologies of investment in land and property, has specified the role of State as the producer of an organism type of land use pattern:

...planners are public authorities at different levels of government (state, district, city) who assemble land for redevelopment, coordinate land uses, and carry out renewal projects. The source of investment is public revenues which are not only invested directly in public projects, but are also invested indirectly when redistributed to landowners in the form of an increase in land value. In the case where the government buys or appropriates land in order to assemble land for development and then sells or gives the land to private developers, taxpayers' money is redistributed to private developers. In the case where land use planning creates an increment in real estate value that is not taxed away, the taxpayers' money is redistributed to developers.

The Government of India and various State Governments have actively intervened in redefining land use pattern, often to the detriment of the peasant-cultivators. In most situations, the real beneficiaries were the speculators, developers, builders, bureaucrats, and the planning and executing body. The case of New Bombay is a classic example of state intervention that completely redefined the relationship between land and peasant-cultivators. The New Bombay project acquired large amounts of agricultural and saltpan land from peasants in 95 villages. The lands were developed using public money and distributed to developers, builders, industries, and private individuals. The peasants and fishermen lost the land for meagre cash compensation.

### **Objectives of the Paper**

The objectives of this paper are to trace the origin of New Bombay and assess the condition of peasants who had lost land to the project. The paper concentrates on the people who lost land and livelihood to facilitate the creation of a port as part of the New Bombay project. First, this paper traces the origin of the idea for the creation of New Bombay to attract people and industry so as to decongest Bombay. Second, the process of agricultural and saltpan land acquisition and the

protest action by the people are analysed. Third, the process of transformation of peasants, salt workers, and fishermen into organised and unorganised sector wage-workers, and the consequent change in their economic condition, is discussed. Finally, salient conclusions emerging from the analysis are given, and suggestions are made to modify the rehabilitation policy to ensure that the people thus affected are not economically and socially marginalised. Data for the paper come from a larger study, conducted for the port administration, on the socio-economic condition of the households that lost land to the Jawaharlal Nehro Port (JNP).

### INITIATION OF THE TWIN-CITY CONCEPT

By the year 1961, the city of Bombay had an area of 603 sq km and a population of 4.2 million spread all over the island, and further expansion was considered difficult. A number of options were discussed to ease the congestion. The first option was to shift the State capital to Nagpur, which was already conceded as the winter capital of Maharashtra. The second option was to move the headquarters of selected ministries to areas outside Bombay, possibly to the mainland across the Bombay harbour. The third option was to decentralise the industries and businesses and relocate them elsewhere. The idea was to ban settlement of new large and medium industrial units in Bombay and offer incentives to the settled ones to move out [Verma (1985)]. In 1964, the First Development Plan for Greater Bombay for the period 1964–81 was presented by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay for the Government's approval. The Plan recommended decentralisation of industry and commerce in the city to suburbs and beyond, from non-conforming to conforming zones. The idea was that with decongestion of industries and business, the population would also spread over to the extended suburbs and beyond. The Plan proposed development of a number of satellite towns in nearby districts to absorb migrants who may otherwise come to Bombay [Government of Maharashtra (1964)].

Relocation of business and industries meant crossing the Thane and Bassein creeks and moving on to the mainland, [Verma (1985)]. The business and industrial community of Bombay, concerned about the fresh investments they would have to make on infrastructure and establishment in the new location away from the city limits, reacted sharply to the development plan. They argued that the future urban growth should create an entirely new structural pattern to stop the flow of migrants to Bombay—and for this strong counter magnets are needed; that the creation of satellite towns will not serve that purpose unless they are sufficiently close to Bombay to attract industry and population. Thus, an idea of developing a twin-city, New Bombay, across the harbour and opposite Bombay, was initiated. Acceptance of this idea by the Government would bring immense benefits to the industrial and business community as they were already finding it difficult to expand within

Bombay limits, and, at the same time, were unwilling to invest, on their own, in infrastructure development in the mainland. The acceptance also meant shelving of the Bombay Development Plan, thus leaving their interest in Bombay unaltered [Verma (1985); D'Souza (1991)].

The Government accepted the new Bombay plan in 1971, which envisaged the creation of a new modern port across the existing Bombay port, the creation of infrastructure for the development of industries, business, and housing. Land on the mainland to be acquired, from peasants and fishermen, was conceived as a primary resource for the development of New Bombay.<sup>1</sup> Section 3F of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 gives authority to acquire land for such purposes: i.e., the "provision of land for planned development of land from public funds under any scheme or policy of the government and the subsequent disposal of such land by way of lease, assignment or sale" [MARG (1990); Dhagamwar (1991)].

The assemblage of parcels of land, coordination of land uses, investment in infrastructure, public services, and renewal projects in New Bombay by the Government were, thus, basically oriented towards the needs of the rich and the business community.<sup>2</sup> This form of urban development is oriented towards private business where the control and direction of the main resource—land—is no more with the Government but in fact with the profiteers and speculators [Sharma (1991)].

### DEVELOPMENT OF NEW BOMBAY

The Government of Maharashtra notified an area of 343.7 sq km of land for acquisition (under national and public interest clause of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act) from 95 villages (affecting a population of over 0.2 million) for the development of New Bombay. 33 villages were to be completely displaced, that is, lose all

<sup>1</sup>The Government of Maharashtra was experienced in using land acquired from farmers in the fringe areas of cities and towns in the State to develop industrial estates that were sold for business and industrial activities. These industrial estates generated vast surpluses because the land was acquired very cheaply and infrastructure development did not cost much. The government and the industries benefited while the poor farmers lost out in such an exercise. Bombay's rich wanted the Government to replicate the industrial estate experience on a grand scale in New Bombay, using the lands of peasants and fishermen of Thane and Raigad districts. The success of the industrial estate concept motivated the Government to accept the twin-city idea to use land as a resource to develop New Bombay, even though the magnitude of land required and population displaced from lands and livelihood in this case would be much greater [Verma (1985)].

<sup>2</sup>In 1993, New Bombay is a thriving city with a population of over one million, with land speculators seeking enormous gains by manipulating the planning body and the market for self-interest. The source of investment for the planning body as well as the developers are the public deposits. To a great extent, the planning body itself has become a speculator, with massive deposits collected from public, that is the organised-sector salaried class from Bombay. The arrival of large developers from Bombay has pushed up the cost of land by 240 percent and the cost of houses by 350 percent in a decade, with 1990 as base year. On the other hand, peasants losing land in 1990 were paid compensation amounts per acre fixed in the early 1980s [CIDCO Documents (1990)].

lands and houses. The fully displaced villages were to be given alternative places for establishing houses. The remaining 62 villages were to lose all agricultural and common lands, but the houses were not to be acquired.

The Government created a body called the City and Industrial Development Corporation (CIDCO) for the development and administration of New Bombay. The task of CIDCO involved acquiring, developing, and disposing of land throughout the project area in a fashion so as to achieve the specific nodal and city structure goals and priorities [Verma (1985)]. CIDCO, however, did not have the financial capacity to acquire all notified land and develop it in a short period. In the 1970s, it acquired land as and when it was necessary, without de-notifying other notified areas not required in the near future. However, in the early 1980s, it was able to quantify more accurately the land that would be needed for the next 10 years, and acquired that amount of land. The rest of the land, originally notified by the government, was temporarily de-notified.

### Peoples' Protest Against Land Acquisition in the 1970s

People who were to lose land to CIDCO were not willing to part with their agricultural and saltpan lands. Their opposition was sustained, though only for a limited period, by two forces. First, the Peasants and Workers Party (PWP), which had a strong base in the project notified areas, opposed the New Bombay project. The opposition also had the support of leaders of the ruling Congress Party. Leaders of the Congress Party and PWP had large areas of *Benami* lands<sup>3</sup> in the affected districts and, thus, a vested interest in delaying land acquisition [Verma (1981)]. Delays normally meant payment of compensation at enhanced rates.<sup>4</sup> Second, elite groups and academics in Greater Bombay did not approve of New Bombay and displacement of a large number of people. The people affected by the project expressed their opposition in a variety of ways. After prolonged agitation, CIDCO reached a settlement with the leaders of the project-affected people in 1979, fixing the price of land at Rs 15000 per acre [Verma (1985)]. But the 1979 settlement was not binding on all project-affected people spread over 95 villages. Agitation erupted as and when fresh land was acquired. The interest of the Bombay elite was short-lived, and was not forthcoming in the 1980s and later.

<sup>3</sup>The term *Benami* land refers to the land registered in the name of a proxy person, related or unrelated to the actual owner. Unrelated persons are basically bound to the actual owner under some strong obligation or patronage. Land is held under proxy names in order to escape action under the Land Ceiling Act.

<sup>4</sup>In most projects in India, work normally begins before basic issues are settled. In New Bombay's case, the contracts were appointed before lands were acquired. In order to get the work started, the pressure to acquire land became serious. Thus, in response to the agitation by land-owners, CIDCO agreed to pay compensation at an enhanced rate.

### **Resettlement and Rehabilitation Provisions for the New Bombay Project-affected**

As stated, all land acquisition within the State of Maharashtra is governed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Since the 1976 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act of the Government of Maharashtra dealt only with irrigation projects, a notification was issued for the purposes of compensating New Bombay project-affected families. The Resettlement and Rehabilitation provisions included: cash compensation to those losing land and/or house in their name; houseplots in resettlement sites to those who lost houses; households losing one or more than one acre land were entitled to a job each in the New Bombay project, if available; preference in low-level State Government jobs; young men and women<sup>5</sup> from project-affected households to get admission to the Industrial Training Institute (ITI) of CIDCO, and the Government to enable them to acquire technical skills; and the resettlement areas were to be provided with school, water, road, transport, ration, and medical facilities by CIDCO. Those who were engaged in saltpan work on government land and in fishing, and those who were landless or self-employed, did not get any compensation. Those who lost less than one acre (a large number of households owned less than one acre of land) were not considered eligible for employment with the New Bombay project.<sup>6</sup>

### **Land Acquisition for Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP): People's Action**

In 1980, the Government issued an initial notification under Section 4.1 of the 1894 Act for acquisition of land in 12 villages of Uran *tehsil* for the purposes of constructing a port. This was followed, in 1981, by the Government's declaration of intended land acquisition under Section 6.1. A compensation notice under Section 9 was issued in 1982-83. Land was to be acquired at Rs 15000.00 per acre, a rate fixed for the land acquired in the 1970s. The deep resentment among the people of the suggested compensation amount led to the formation of the "Jamin Bachao Samiti" (The Save Land Committee) in 1980 and the project-affected people came together to fight for better compensation. The leadership of the Samiti came from

<sup>5</sup>Land-owners whose lands were acquired could claim a job in the industrial estate for any educated member of the household. If there were no educated members in the household, children were assisted to gain ITI qualifications. CIDCO opened an ITI of its own to train children from the affected households. In reality, the industrial estates did not have the capacity to absorb the displaced people.

<sup>6</sup>According to a 1967 Government of India notification, households losing land for industries can claim employment with the industry. However, most projects redefine this provision according to their convenience. Given the number of jobs that can be given to project-affected people, the job offer starts from households that have lost the largest amount of land. In the process, small and marginal farmers fail to get employment.

outside the project-affected villages.

In 1984, the Government intensified the land acquisition process. By that time, the movement had grown in strength and people demanded Rs 40000.00 per acre as compensation. Many meetings were held among CIDCO officials, Government of Maharashtra, and the *Jamin Bachao Samiti* but no settlement could be reached. Indecision on the part of the Government led to police action, in which five people were killed. In February 1984, the Government, *Samiti*, and CIDCO officials reached a compromise and a cash compensation of Rs 23000.00 per acre was to be paid. Further, an interest of 12 percent per annum would be paid for the period between the issuance of Section 4.1 notice and the final payment of compensation. Thus, the Government paid Rs 27000.00 per acre plus a grant of Rs 3000.00 per acre. There was a variation in the amount of compensation paid per acre depending on the quality of land and trees on the land [Parasuraman and Sengupta (1992)].

Thus, CIDCO acquired 2584 hectares of land for the port from 12 villages, from the following sources:

1. Private agricultural and houseplot land	1185 ha.
2. Saltpan land owned by the Government	1023 ha.
3. Revenue Department land	376 ha.
Total	2584 ha.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE PROJECT-AFFECTED PEOPLE BEFORE LAND ACQUISITION

### (a) Social Aspects of the Project-affected People

In the project-affected villages, caste groups such as *Agris*, *Kolis*, and *Karadis* accounted for 98 percent of the population. All of them belong to "Backward Communities", according to the Government of Maharashtra classification of caste groups by their social and economic status in the state. *Marathas* and *Brahmins*, the economically and socially higher caste groups in the State, accounted for only two percent of the population in the project area.

*Agris* were the largest caste group (78 percent of the 1753 households) in the project area. *Agris* (which literally means "gardeners" in the *Marathi* language) were found along the creek banks of Alibag, Pen, and Uran *tehsils*. The *Agris* are salt-makers and tillers of salt rice land. No other group from the district (Kolabha) had greater or even equal skills in salt land tillage [Government of Maharashtra (1968, 1964)]. *Agris* were also engaged in fishing but not as a main occupation. Ten percent of the population in the port-affected villages were *Kolis*, by tradition fisherman and sailors. In the social hierarchy, *Kolis* rank below *Agris*. All seven islands

that constitute the present-day Bombay were originally populated by *Kolis* and *Agris*. A large number of *Kolis* and *Agris*, who were originally living in Bombay islands, were evicted from there many decades ago, and had now settled in areas from where the New Bombay project has been evicting them since 1970. *Karadis* accounted for another 10 percent of the population. They were cultivators, labourers in salt-making, and also engaged in fishing. In social status, they were close to the *Agris* [Census of India (1931); Government of Maharashtra (1968, 1964)]. The *Chaukalsis* and *Packalsis* are sub-sects of the *Marathas*, and together accounted for two percent of the population in the villages. The *Marathas* and *Chaukalsis* were relatively large landowners and engaged in industrial and government service. *Packalsis* are also known as *sutars* (wood-workers) and *malis* (gardeners) on the basis of the type of work they performed. The *Marathas*, *Chaukalsis*, and *Packalsis* are located in the middle of the Hindu caste hierarchy.

### (b) Economy of Households

In the pre-land acquisition period, households were dependent on three major sources of income for a livelihood: Agriculture, saltpan work, and fishing. In the monsoon, people worked on rice fields and, later, for eight months beginning in October, concentrated on saltpan work and fishing. A small proportion of households had persons working in industries and Government service, in nearby Thane, Panvel, and Bombay. A few others were involved in construction and public works in and around their villages. However, irrespective of proximity of the project-affected villages to the industrial cities, the economy remained mainly agricultural and dependent on land and sea. The per capita income presented in Table 1 refers to the last year of full economic activity, 1983-84, before households lost access to the resources.

### Saltpan Work

At the time of land acquisition, 1023 ha. of saltpan lands were under use. A few households had saltpan land of their own. Otherwise, most of the saltpan land belonged to the Government but the project-affected people were working on it. For 988 out of 1753 households, saltpan was one of the most important sources of livelihood: 533 owned or possessed saltpan land; 343 did not possess saltpan land but were engaged in wage labour, and 112 possessed land as well as engaged in wage labour. Income from saltpan work was steady for about eight months in a year.

### Fishing

Fishing was another important source of livelihood and all households had



access to the sea. The *Brahmins* and the *Marathas* were not involved in this activity. Fifty-three percent of the *Agris*, 62 percent of the *Karadis*, and 95 percent of the *Kolis* were engaged in fishing as long as they had access to the sea. In all, 908 households out of 1753 (51 percent) were involved in fishing. All households retained some fish for household consumption and sold the rest at Uran or Panvel. It was also sold within the village. Women had the responsibility of selling fish within and outside the village. All households dried and stored some fish for use in the monsoon months when fishing was difficult. As long as they had access to the sea, fish was consumed regularly. In the post-displacement period, all, excepting those in the resettled village located near the sea, had lost access to the sea and income from fishing.

### **Agriculture**

Ninety percent of the 1753 households owned land at the time of land acquisition. Of those who owned land, most had less than 3 acres, with the average around 3.13 acres. About 13 percent of the households owned more than five acres. In all villages, there was a general agreement that the level of landholding had declined considerably, over a period of time, due to constant division. Land was very rarely traded, and this can be seen from the very small proportion of landless households. Most of the landless were *Kolis*, the caste group whose main occupation was fishing. Only one crop, rice, was harvested during the monsoon.

In 46 percent households, harvests were not sufficient for consumption; 40 percent had harvests sufficient for consumption all through the year; and 14 percent had harvests sufficient for consumption and sale. That is, for 54 percent of the households the rice cultivated was good enough for consumption; and for the rest, at least part of the consumption needs were met through cultivation. For most households, loss of land meant the loss of capacity to ensure food availability through agriculture. With assured rain, a certain quantity of rice was available to them every year. Rice and fish formed the staple food of the people, and for the greater part of the year also assured the people of steady nutrition. The shortfall in rice was met through income earned from saltpan and other non-agricultural activities. These three sources of livelihood had the potential of supporting the consumption needs of the people.

### **Wage Labour Activities**

In all, 350 households out of 1753 were engaged in agricultural wage labour. Proximity to Bombay, Panvel, and Thane gave the opportunity for non-agricultural employment. About 17 percent of the households (340 men) had access to industrial employment prior to displacement.

## CHANGES IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AFTER LAND ACQUISITION

In JNP-affected villages, those who lost land lost all had they owned. This project acquired land from 1829 households, and all claimed jobs. JNP found that it could offer jobs to about 450 to 600 persons. To reduce the number of eligible households, it modified the job provision policy so that it would apply only to those who lost more than one acre land. This change reduced the number of households eligible to receive a job by 22 percent, but still JNP could not provide jobs to all. Thus, a strategy was adopted whereby jobs were offered to those households which had lost more land. In the process, the port eliminated all marginal and small farmers who had lost all their land but could not gain jobs.

### (a) Replacement of Lost Resources

Among 1567 households that owned land prior to land acquisition, 93 percent lost all land and the rest lost part of the land. The leftover land was to be acquired later, for other purposes, under the New Bombay project. All saltpan lands were lost. Out of the 12 villages affected by the construction of the port, one village was completely displaced and relocated in three places 6–10 kilometre away from the original village. One relocated village, Hanuman Koliwada was closer to the sea. Excepting the *Koli* households in this relocated village, all others had lost access to the sea and fishing.

The port was required to give employment to all those who lost land. In the port-affected villages, 91 percent households owned land and lost all, but less than 33 percent got employment. Since “one job per household losing land to the industry” was simply a directive from the Government of India, people could not resort to legal procedure to gain employment as entitlement. Those who could not get employment with the port or other industries in the area were engaged in various non-agricultural wage labour activities: loading, unloading, and other contractor-related activities in the port and port-related establishments; sand extraction; Public Works Department and Employment Guarantee Scheme work; and industry-related contractor/casual wage labour activities in the Thane-Panvel-Belapur-Bombay industrial belt.

### (b) Outcome of Resettlement and Rehabilitation Measured in Terms of per Capita Monthly Income

Table 1 provides the distribution of households by monthly per capita income before and after land acquisition. The impact of the port through land acquisition and subsequent offer of permanent employment was not uniform across all households. Out of the 1753 households covered in the study, at least 25 percent experi-

enced significant increases in their per capita income. These were the households that got port employment. A good proportion of the households in this category had more than one permanent industry job either with the port or with other industries in the area. For another 32 percent households, there was no change in the income level. The advent of the port and associated employment enabled these households to regain their previous income level. However, for about 40 percent households, the situation had worsened. Most of these were fishermen and small and marginal farmers who were fully dependent on fishing and salt work. These households could not find industry employment either because they had very little land to lose and thus were eliminated in the job provision method adopted, or because they did not have any literate/skilled person suitable to work at the port. Contractor and casual wage labour have always been patchy and unreliable. In 1991-92, 75 percent, 67 percent, and 42 percent of the households that derived much of their income through non-agricultural wage labour, fishing, and petty business (street vendors), respectively, had a per capita income below Rs 110.00 per month.

Table 1

*Per Capita Monthly Income of Port-affected Households Base 1991-92*

Per Capita Monthly Income (in Rupees)	Distribution of Households			
	1983-84		1991-92	
	Number	%	Number	%
Upto Rs 80	151	8.6	512	29.2
81-110	200	11.4	185	10.6
111-160	507	28.9	231	13.2
161-280	806	46.0	351	20.0
281-370	54	3.1	175	10.0
371+	35	2.0	299	17.0
All	1753	100.0	1753	100.0

Source: Parasuraman and Sengupta (1992) *Socio-economic Condition of People Displaced by Jawaharlal Nehru Port*. Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, Sheva, TISS, Bombay.

In the port-affected villages, there was another problem that was specific to industrial projects. For example, the port affected more households than the distribution in Table 1 reveals. The survey households that existed in 1992 were reorganised according to the original household that existed at the time of displacement. The income earned by each constituent household in 1992 was regrouped to refer to the income for the original household, with all members from the constituent households forming the denominator. The results presented in Table 1 refer to reorganised households that correspond to the original households. If the constituent households were treated as separate entities, as they were in reality in 1992, the income distrib-

ution presents a disturbing picture. The proportion of households with per capita income below Rs 110.00 stands closer to 48 percent, rather than 39.8 percent as seen in Table 1. At the time of land acquisition, 3.7 persons per household had legal access to agricultural and salt land. The compensation money was divided among those entitled to receive. But employment in the port could go only to one person, preferably a person with education or technical skills. It meant that the remaining men automatically lost claim to preferential treatment for jobs in the port or other components of the New Bombay project. Those who gained jobs in the port supported parents in most cases, and shifted to the company township, leaving other male siblings to fend for themselves. Thus, economic disparity among men from the original household has increased. In contrast, saltpan and agricultural land were collectively possessed and cultivated by all men in the household. All had equal access to the sea. This shift from the collective ownership of land and access to the sea's resources to the individual ownership of employment widened the economic disparities among the members of the original household.

### (c) Caste and Differential Impact of the Port

Though the port affected all households to some extent, it seriously affected certain caste groups. A higher proportion of *Kolis* and *Karadis* had a per capita income Rs 160.00 less than that of the *Agris* and the *Marathas*. Those households with permanent employment in industry and service had better income as compared to those engaged in non-agricultural wage labour. Most of the *Kolis* and *Karadis* were engaged in fishing and salt-making for a livelihood, and basically owned less agricultural land. The children of *Kolis* and *Karadis* took to fishing and salt-making at a younger age, and thus had very little or no education. Less land owned and the lack of education among the children worked against these two caste groups in terms of securing employment in the port and industry. (See Table 2.)

Table 2

Caste	<i>Distribution of Households by Caste and Monthly per Capita Income</i>			% of Households with Permanent Jobs in Port or Other Industry
	Per Capita Monthly Income			
	<160	160-280	>281	
	% Distribution of Households			
Agris	48.4	21.2	29.4	40.3
Maratha and Related Castes	17.1	46.4	36.5	83.3
Karadi	59.5	22.6	17.9	30.9
Koli	64.6	13.6	17.9	27.8

**(d) Influx of Migrant Workers Attached to Contractors**

The extent of poverty and economic deprivation in the port was due to the household's inability to replace lost livelihood opportunities. The situation was further complicated by the influx of workers attached to contractors. The project-affected people could not force the contractors not to bring their own labourers from other areas. There was a tendency among the contractors to prefer migrant labourers since they rarely questioned the contractors, were ready to live in work camps, and work on a wage rate far below the minimum wages prevalent in the area. On all these aspects the local people had disputes with the contractors. To some extent, the local people were successful, by attacking the labour camps, in forcing the contractors not to hire migrant labourers.

**(e) Impact of Displacement on Women**

In JNP-affected villages women worked as fish-traders, salt-makers, cultivators, and agricultural wage labourers. While fishing was entirely a male activity, women shouldered the entire task of retailing. About 60 percent of all activities related to salt-making and rice cultivation were undertaken by women. Because of their involvement in fish sales, they had greater access to money and independence in allocation of monies. Women belonging to the *Agri* and *Koli* castes, together accounting for 90 percent of the households affected by the port, had greater autonomy and access to economic resources. The port acquired all agricultural and salt-pan land and closed access to the sea. With that, women lost access to all sources of work in the post-port period and no viable employment alternatives for them emerged. The booming but extremely exploitative construction industry in New Bombay and Panvel (about 10 km from the affected villages) provided alternative employment but women from displaced households were not used to such work. A few women from extremely poor households thus took up work as petty traders, construction workers, and casual labourers. All these activities were in no way comparable to their status as fish-traders, rice-cultivators, and salt-makers. In a way, the Port is a symbol of the complete marginalisation of women from income-providing work. Traditional sources of livelihood owned by the household and the enduring support of the sea facilitated women's work, honour, and dignity. Now men became the exclusive contributors to household income through their permanent employment with the port or other forms of industry-related employment in the area. Most women considered their current position as humiliating, as until recently they were proud self-employed, economically strong, and contended individuals [Parasuraman and Sengupta (1992)].

## **INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION**

The institutions charged with the execution of resettlement and rehabilitation programmes assume importance in deciding the outcome of a project. The agency responsible for resettlement and rehabilitation work may vary among different projects within a State. The Government of Maharashtra has a strong Department of Relief and Rehabilitation headed by a senior secretary. The Government is responsible for land acquisition, payment of compensation, and the implementation programme. In case of the New Bombay project, once the compensation was paid, the Collector issued eligibility certificates for employment to those who lost land. Beyond that, the port was responsible for implementing the resettlement and rehabilitation work, i.e., the creation of infrastructure in the resettled and partially affected villages, the provision of health-care services, and the provision of employment. A review of the resettlement and rehabilitation, activities and their impact on the life-conditions of the affected people reveals the following.

In India once an industry assumes responsibility for resettlement and rehabilitation work, the Government rarely attempts to interfere. The Government departments responsible for the provision of education, health-care, water, and community infrastructure normally avoid intervention, leaving the responsibility for all such provisions to the industry. The provision of such services was considered the social responsibility of the industry. The port provided some access to medical services and installed a few water taps.

The Department of Administration of the port was responsible for implementing the resettlement and rehabilitation work. The port did not have officials with experience in rehabilitation work. A review of the profile of the officials involved in resettlement and rehabilitation work revealed that most of them were insensitive to the losses people suffered. They did not attempt to comprehend the priority needs of different groups of affected people and develop suitable intervention measures. The authorities could not see beyond the narrow focus of the Government's resettlement and rehabilitation provisions. Imaginative strategies were lacking. In the process, vulnerable groups such as women, landless and marginal landholders, and fishermen were the worst affected by displacement.

The port authorities did not make any conscious attempt to create any rapport with the people in the resettled and partially affected villages. In a situation of lack of confidence, or rapport and meaningful communication, the affected people wished only for permanent employment. The port has never acknowledged the fact that it cannot provide employment to all project-affected households. Unless that point was made clear and the project-affected people were made mentally receptive to alternative ideas, the port authorities would continue to find it difficult to work with them.

## CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The extent of land acquired was far in excess of the amount required for the present and future needs of the port [Verma (1985)]. It could have functioned efficiently with less land. On the other hand, modern technology used in port operations could absorb only very few workers, and only those with technical qualification. Thus, the port could not provide employment to one member from each household that lost land, as per the directive given by the Government of India. Instead, the port adopted a strategy whereby only those who owned and thus lost more land were given employment. The small and marginal farmers and the fishermen who were seriously affected due to land acquisition by the port and denial of access to sea were not given employment. The unused land is now being handed over to private-sector builders. A large scale housing scheme catering to the needs of industrial workers in areas between Panvel and Uran is being implemented. Thus, those who lost land could neither use the vacant land for cultivation nor share the profit made by CIDCO/JNP through the sale of land to builder-contractors and developers. The Government acquired land using the outdated 1894 Land Acquisition Act for meagre cash compensation, which is now being used to serve the interests of the rich. The Government could develop a policy whereby the affected people were treated as partners in developing the unused land, thus enabling them to benefit from the profits generated through its sales.

Provision of permanent employment is only one element of any rehabilitation framework. Other measures could have been developed to assist the households not covered under the job provision measure. The port was in a good position to rehabilitate the affected people because of its financial and managerial autonomy as a public-sector undertaking. However, it failed to assess the skills and capacities of the people to engage in alternative productive activities. The contiguous area formed by New Bombay, Thane, Panvel, and Uran is the fastest industrialising area in the country and is located close to the project-affected villages. There was, and still is, immense scope for gainful employment in this area. The area also offers much scope for self-employment in contract activities, transportation, repair works, and business. However, the project-affected people were ill-equipped to take advantage of the growing industrial employment opportunities in their area. The much-needed reorientation for acquiring new skills, finance, and initial moral back-up to exploit employment opportunities was not facilitated for those vulnerable groups which most needed support from the port to re-establish their access to new sources of employment. There was a complete lack of rehabilitation planning. Well-trained community organisers and development workers with a clear rehabilitation mandate could have facilitated the vulnerable groups to rise above their miserable condition.

The port, like all other industrial projects, seriously undermined the economic position of a large number of households. First, the cash compensation was inade-

quate and insufficient to buy similar land anywhere in the district. Further, there were no viable investment opportunities available when compensation was paid. Because of comprehensive land acquisition over a large area, there was no land left for purchasing. In the port and other industrial projects, there was a gap of 5–10 years between the time the compensation was paid and the actual arrival of investment opportunities. It was only after the completion of construction and inauguration of its operations that employees and their families arrived in the project area, thereby creating a demand for a variety of services. About 75 percent of the displaced received less than Rs 10000.00 and could not save the money until suitable investment opportunities arrived. Only those who received a large compensation could invest during the construction stage on contract or transportation activities, or could save the money for investment at a later date. Further, they received employment with the industry because of large land loss, while the poor could not get such work. The rehabilitation policy may be suitably modified to incorporate such provisions as may facilitate the affected people to invest the compensation money in productive assets. Loans and subsidies may also be made available to augment the compensation money for suitable investment.

In the affected villages, agriculture formed a well-defined domain of women's productive activity. But in the changed situation, women had no defined role. Men were better placed to get the relatively scarce organised factory employment created by industrial growth. Employers and trade unions preferred men even when women with required qualification were available. This pattern has not only led to a greater degree of pauperisation of displaced women but has also increasingly confined women to the margins of the labour market. Special attention should be given to women in the rehabilitation policies and provisions. Women require training in useful skills to find employment in the new industrial environment.

## *Appendix*

### **APPENDIX I**

This study used three methods for data collection: (i) Tracer Studies, (ii) Household Survey with a questionnaire, and (iii) Focus Group Discussion.

#### **(i) Tracer Study**

In order to study the resettlement pattern and dispersal of households, tracer studies related to all affected villages were done. The idea is to trace all the households that existed prior to displacement in the post-project period. The tracer study methodology is as follows: The households existing in the original villages prior to land acquisition were reconstructed from the documents of revenue department at



the *tehsil* office. The office of the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) had documents related to the acquisition of land, trees, and house, and cash compensation payment. The official resettlement sites of one fully affected village were identified and all households were enumerated. A similar enumeration was done in partially affected villages. The list prepared at the revenue department and the LAO office was matched with the households found in the resettled and partially affected villages. A list of families found before land acquisition but not traced in the resettled and partially affected villages was prepared for further tracing. The missing households were rearranged according to caste affiliation in consultation with people at the resettled village. The whereabouts of the missing members and households for each village were ascertained through group discussions with the members from the same caste now resident of the resettled village. This exercise was done for all affected villages.

### (ii) Household Survey

All affected households were to be covered for the household survey. Out of the 2010 affected households, 1753 were traced and interviewed. In the post-project period, if the original household has broken and settled as more than one household, all units were covered. These independent households were pooled together for analysis as the original household was the unit of reference.

Project	Affected Households	Traced	Number Covered in Household Survey	Number of Focus Groups Covered
JNP	2010	1753	1753	28

### (iii) Focus Group Discussion

In order to have an insight into the displacement, resettlement, and rehabilitation process, focus group discussions were conducted. In all, 28 groups were formed on the basis of age, sex, caste, and employment with the port and other organised sector. FGD was used as a tool to generate fresh information on issues specific to the group and community. In addition FGD was used to triangulate the data collected from household interviews, government data, and case studies.

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