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Conflict and Religious Preferences: Evidence from a Civil Conflict in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we study the endogenous structure of religious preferences in post-conflict life. By providing evidence from a civil conflict which occurred in district Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan, we want to see how religious preferences change once individuals are exposed to conflict. We take five aspects of religious preferences, i.e. basic rituals, religious humanistic values, religion-based trust, participation and cooperation. District Buner—a neighbouring district—is taken as the control district. A random sample of 400 households from each district is selected and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design (SRDD) are employed for estimation. We find that exposure to conflict strengthens fundamental rituals and religious humanistic values; however, it lowers trust in religious seminaries and figures along with participation in religious gatherings. Likewise, conflict raises trust and participation in welfare religious organisations; however, it discourages trust and participation in general religious organisations. Furthermore, conflict encourages cooperation with welfare religious organisations; however, it retards cooperation with general religious organisations. The intensity of these effects is influenced by the location of individuals. Alternatively, highly exposed areas exhibit comparatively higher changes in religious preferences as compared to the moderately and least affected areas.

JEL Classification: D74, J24, C1

Keywords: Conflict, Religious Preferences, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Spatial Regression Discontinuity (SRDD)

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic development is perceived to be reliant on society's endowment structure, institutional arrangements, and policy outlooks. Religion, being a part of the inherited structure of informal institutions, has a predominant bearing on human development (Blum and Dudley, 2001; Haynes, 2007; Voigt, 2013; Clarke, 2016; Karaçuka, 2018).¹ The last four to five decades have witnessed greater consciousness among academicians and practitioners to closely inquire the role of religion in the process of economic development and societal transition (Kirmani, 2008; Rothstein and Broms, 2013).² This implies that the role of religion has not been disappeared from the public sphere as a consequence of the societal transition towards increasingly modern values. Given these presumptions, the nexus between religion and conflict has become a heated issue in the contemporary academic discourse (Piazza, 2009; Gunning and Jackson, 2011; Svensson and Nilsson, 2018; Finnbogason and Svensson, 2018). So far, there have been three thoughts which deal with the interaction between religion and conflict. First, the Ambivalence of Religion asserts that religion inspires both peace and conflict (Fox, 2005; Toft, 2006). Second, the Clash of Civilisation asserts that global conflicts usually follow the religious lines (Huntington, 1993). Third, the approach of Fundamentalism tells us that each major religion, more or less, includes the rigid version of religious interpretations which might incite fundamentalism, religious violence, and armed conflict (Bolks and Stoll, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006; Berman, 2009).

In general, religion as an institution is more persistent and culturally less heterogeneous (Bénabou et al. 2013). Change in religious beliefs (informal instructions) is a complex process, from the perspectives of both individuals and society (Wadsworth and Freeman, 1983). The theories of institutional change postulate that institutions are path dependent and, thereby, less changeable in abrupt manner. Alternatively, changes in institutions are incremental and take place as part of a wider process of social evolution (Klauer et al. 2016). However, at the individual level, the experience of shocks in life alters the underlying information processing mechanism in society which, in turn, leads to the transformation of religious preferences (Decker, 1993; Chemtob et al. 1988; McCann and Pearlman, 1990; Ben-Ezra et al. 2010). Religious beliefs are, in fact, hypothesised as the cognitive appraisal, aiming to support the individuals' pursuit in times of misfortunes (McIntosh, 1995; Park, 2005).³ Shocks, contrary to the existing beliefs of individuals,

¹Religion involves an aggregation of human attitudes, beliefs, and actions in the face of two types of experience—the experience of the supernatural and the experience of the sacred (Berger, 2015).

²For a longer span, the absence of the role of religion in the development policy and practice, and the lack of explicit inclusion of the religion into the development research agenda largely reflected the insufficient religious knowledge on part of the development agencies (Rakodi, 2012).

³For instance, beliefs in a benevolent divine, predictability, order and an unprejudiced world all help in times of misfortunes (Lerner and Miller, 1978).

transform the beliefs system into a structure which entails completely different risk assessment, interpersonal mistrust, and stressful and terrifying behaviours (Astin et al. 1993; Falsetti et al. 2003; Lifton, 2012). In some instances, when the religious beliefs are confronted by trauma and devastation, the existing beliefs might be rejected in whole (Albrecht and Cornwall, 1989; Pargament et al. 1990). In other instances, some individuals might uphold or strengthen their existing beliefs to make sense of shocks as part of a “sacred order” (Berger, 2015). Historically, conflicts and natural disorders have resulted in new movements in religion, such as paradigm shifts in religious consciousness, fervid revivalism, awakening, and apocalyptic expectations (Jenkins, 2014). Such happenings have reproduced entirely new denominations in religion.⁴ For instance, some of the survivors of Holocaust increased religious affiliation and made sense that God has been testing their faith in a similar way as in the biblical story of Job (Carmil and Breznitz, 1991; Scholte et al. 2004). Likewise, after the event of 9/11, majority of the US citizens turned to religion to cope with the trauma (Meisenhelder and Marcum, 2004).

To our knowledge, the impact of traumatic events on religious preferences has not been systematically investigated. In this study, we examine the dynamics of religious preferences in response to the violent conflict which occurred in District Swat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan. In Swat, the non-state actors, under the leadership of ‘Mullah Fazalullah’ started an Islamic movement in the valley in 2004 (which later turned into violent conflicts) to impose their so-called Islamic ideology in the region. The persistent conflict between the militants and the state forces for many years resulted in destruction of the physical infrastructure, civilian casualties, and breakdown of the social and institutional structure in the region. We take five aspects of religious preferences, i.e. basic rituals, religious humanistic values, religion-based trust, participation and cooperation and see how the preferences with regard to these aspects change when the status-quo is exposed to violent conflict. We contribute on three fronts in this regard. First, we want to see how the eruption of violent conflicts affect religious preferences and set a new equilibrium path. Second, the existing literature on war and institutions considers narrow proxies of the religious preferences while we are comprehensive in our approach by focusing on a broad set of post-conflict preferences. Third, the onset of violent shocks in the valley of Swat provides a reasonable setting to explore its religious aspects because these conflicts are largely guided by the religious interpretations. Rest of the study is organised in four sections. Section 2 describes a brief background of the conflict in Swat. We discuss the sampling technique, data, measurement of the main variables, and identification strategy in Section 3. Section 4 provides the empirical findings while Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. RELIGION, VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND THE VALLEY OF SWAT

Swat Valley is an administrative district, sprawling on an area of 5337 sq. km in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan. The population of the district is around 2.3 million (Population Census, 2017). Moreover, it shares borders with districts of Malakand and Buner in the south, Upper and Lower Dir to the west, and Gilgit Baltistan and Chitral to north.

⁴For instance, the prolonged hegemonic culture between the Protestants and Catholics has resulted in significant transformation in religious beliefs (Wolffe, 2011).

The inhabitants of the valley are mainly Pashtun (dominated by the Yousafzai tribe) and their social, political and economic lives are significantly shaped by the Pashtuns' culture (Pashtunwali code of conduct) and Islamic principles. Swat was one of the areas where Buddhism flourished during the time of King Asoka, which later gave way to its conversion to Islam in 1100 AD. The system that emerged in the aftermath was a blend of Riway (customary practices) and Islam with the influence of Sufis' thoughts, which had prevailed in the entire region. The religious leadership that emerged in Swat in the centuries following the emergence of Islam played an important role in sociopolitical life of the inhabitants (Orakzai, 2011). This religious leadership had two tiers: Stanadars (descendants of holy men, but not preachers) and Pirs (Sufi religious leaders, mystics, and preachers). Stanadars played mediator role in solving the land disputes among the inhabitants, while, the Pirs had great influence on the life of inhabitants due to their spirituality and relationship with God (Lindholm, 1979). These religious leaders played an important role in times of crises involving religious and tribal conflicts. The Mian Gul Abdul Wadud, the first ruler of Swat state in 1915, abolished the powers of Stanadars and Sufis concerning the religious interpretation and decision making while appropriating all powers. The legal system he established was a combination of the decisions of Wali, Riway, and Shariah. However, it was effective, i.e. the trials were quick and inexpensive, and the judgments/verdicts were properly executed (Rome, 2011).

After the region's integration into Pakistan in 1969, the national judicial system was extended to the Swat Valley, which, with other factors such as complications under the provincially administrative Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations and misuse of Riway, resulted in an increasing demand for Islamic laws. The history of conflict in Swat valley can be traced back to such a demand when an Islamic movement '*Tehrike-Nifaz-e-Shariah-Mohammadi*' (TNSM) started by Sufi Mohammad Khan in 1992 launched an armed movement '*Tor-Patki*' (black turban) and demanded to immediately impose Sharia's laws in the region. However, after a short operation by the government, negotiations took place between government and TNSM. As a consequence, the government established 'Sharia courts' through the '*Nezam-e-Shariat Regulation*'. Nevertheless, to TSNM, the regulations of the government were insufficient to resolve their grievances. Hence, their struggle continued even after the implementation of regulation, which often resulted in an irregular war in the region (Rome, 2008). When US invaded Afghanistan, the Sufi Mohammad Khan, recruited more than 10000 people from the valley to fight NATO forces (Roggio, 2009). However, when Pakistan became US ally in war against terror, the government banned the TNSM and apprehended Sufi Muhammad Khan. After his detention, his son-in-law Mullah Fazalullah led the movement and established a close association with militant groups across the country to suppress the state writ in the valley. To promote his ideas of opposing the female education, judicial system and other informal social setup, Fazalullah initiated a radio campaign (Siddique, 2010). He operated more than 30 illegal FM radio stations throughout the Swat valley, which made him famous as the 'Radio Mullah'. The Fazalullah changed inhabitants' preferences by exploiting the deteriorated formal structure and providing quick rehabilitation assistance in 2005 earthquake.⁵ In response to

⁵However, it is important to note that 2005 earthquake also hit the neighboring district like Buner, Dir and Shangla with the same magnitude.

the ‘Lal Masjid’ operation of Islamabad in 2007, Fazalullah decided a full violent struggle in the valley. To limit their power, the government launched a military operation; however, operation failed to limit the power and presence of the militants, the militants controlled the administration of Swat.

During 2007-09, violent struggle of the militants touched the highest point. They attacked security personnel, local leaders, civil society, and destroyed hospitals and schools in the valley. Additionally, they formed informal justice system to solve the indigenous disputes and challenged the local Jirgas system. During this period, the militants captured 59 villages and seized nearly 70percent area of the valley (Orakzai, 2011). Nevertheless, to bring back the life to normal state, the government initiated peace talks with militants. To facilitate negotiation, the government released Sufi Muhammad Khan in 2008. In April 2008, government reached 16-pointspeace agreement. However, the accord lived for a short time, and militants further accelerated their violent activities. The government attempted a new talk of peace in the presence of Sufi Muhammad, which led to the declaration of a short-term ceasefire in the valley. Subsequently, the government decided to implement the Sharia laws in the region.⁶ On February 15, 2009, the government implemented the sharia laws in Swat via religious courts system under a *Qazi*, which is commonly known as the *Nizam-e-Adl* Regulation 2009 (Hilali, 2009).

The peace process yet again remained an incomplete dream when Sufi Muhammad Khan refused to be part of the negotiation. In the mid-2009, the militants escalated their activities. To encounter militancy, government decided to launch the operation ‘*Rah-e-Rast*’ (The Straight Way) in 2009. The operation removed the militancy and established government writ; however, it caused one of the world largest internal migration of around 2 million people. The conflict and the subsequent internal migration have substantially changed the informal structure and the preferences of the society. In this study, we want to focus on this aspect.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this section, we provide a brief description of the sampling technique and data besides giving a glimpse of the identification strategy.

3.1. Sampling Technique, Data and Construction of Variables

In this study, we collect primary data through questionnaires in two districts of KP, namely Swat and Buner. Buner is kept as a reference category or the control group in our analysis. Each of the district is administratively divided into tehsil, and each tehsil is, further, divided into village councils/neighbourhood councils. Therefore, we resort to the approach of cluster sampling. We have seven tehsils in Swat, i.e. *Babozai*, *Bahrain*, *Barikot*, *Charbagh*, *Khwazakhela*, *Kabal*, *Matta* and four tehsils in Buner, i.e. *Khudukhail*, *Mandnr*, *Gagra*, *Daggar*. Additionally, seven tehsils of Swat and four of Buner are divided into 165 and 105 villages councils, respectively. We treat each of the tehsils as a separate cluster and the village/neighbourhood councils as sub-clusters. We

⁶It is important to note that Sharia Laws were implemented in whole Malakand Division, which include Swat, Buner, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, and Chitral districts. For detailed discussion see also Roggio (2009).

perform a random selection among the sub-clusters which serve as the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). Accordingly, 100 and 70 villages/ neighbourhoods councils from districts Swat and Buner, respectively, are randomly selected. Onwards, we retrieve the identity list of the Secondary, Sampling Units (SSUs), i.e., households of selected sub-clusters from the districts' local administration. Further, we randomly choose the desired sample of households from each tehsil on the basis of households' share. According to the population census report of Pakistan of 2017, the total number of households in districts Swat and Buner are 274620 and 94095, respectively. Since the households' size are known to us, we calculate the representative sample through the Yamane sample size formula. We assume 95 percent confidence interval and 5 percent margin of error. Based on these values, we select 400 households from each district. Finally, after conducting all the process, we collect the data on different variables of interest through the questionnaires.

We focus on different forms of religious preferences, including basic religious rituals, religious humanistic values, religion-based trust, participation and cooperation. We quantify each of the sub-elements of these preferences by a Likert scale of 1 to 4, whereas 1 shows the lowest level and 4 implies the highest level of preferences. A composite index of each of these preferences is, then, computed by taking the average of the scores on sub-elements. The detailed summary statistics on these aspects are given in table A1 and A2 in the appendix. Basic rituals capture individuals' inclination towards God (*Allah*) in times of adversity, their acts on the holy saying of prophet in daily life, frequency of offering prayers, payment of due *Zakah*, offering of Hajj, and keeping the fasting in the month of Ramadan. Religious humanistic values include individuals' extension of financial and social support to family members, relatives, neighbours, and poor. Besides, it includes the level of individuals' tolerance to contradictory views of the others, involving in a community welfare services, and observing moral and social ethics. The summary statistics shows that, in 2010 and 2018, both the rituals and humanistic values are relatively higher in Swat as compared to Buner. Alternatively, conflict enhances the observance of rituals and humanistic values in Swat.

Religious trust includes trust on religious seminaries, religious figures, welfare religious organisations, and non-welfare religious organisations. Trust in religious seminaries is the trust on private rudimentary and higher schools of theology, and public schools of theology. Similarly, trust on religious figures is the trust on clerics, spiritual healers, and saints. Similarly, trust on welfare religious organisations is sum of the trust on two organisations, i.e., the Al-Khidmat Foundation and Ummah Welfare Trust that usually work for human welfare in times of crises. Trust on non-welfare religious organisations incorporates trust on three organisations, i.e., Tableeghi Jamat, Tanzeem-e-Islami, and Dawati-e-Islami that work only for the promotion of religious values in the society. The descriptive analysis shows that, in both 2010 and 2018, trust on religious seminaries, religious figures and non-welfare religious organisations is higher in Buner; however, trust in welfare religious organisations is relatively higher in Swat. In other words, conflict exposed individuals value welfare-oriented activities more as compared to theology-oriented activities.

We take different forms of participation, i.e. participation in religious gatherings, participation in welfare religious organisations, and participation in non-welfare religious

organisations. Participation in religious gatherings includes individuals' participation in religious gathering such as funeral prayers, collective prayers in times of adversities, and Quranic recitation gatherings. Participation in welfare religious organisations includes individuals' membership and participation in welfare programs of the welfare religious organisations at the village and non-local levels. Participation in non-welfare religious organisations incorporate individuals' membership and participation in religious programs of the religious organisations at the village and non-local levels. Again, the level of participation in both periods in religious gatherings and non-welfare religious organisations is relatively higher in Buner; however, participation in welfare religious organisations is relatively higher in Swat. Again, conflict exposed individuals prefer participation in welfare-oriented activities as compared to participation in theology-oriented activities.

Likewise, we take different forms of cooperation in our analysis, such as cooperation with welfare religious organisations, and cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations. Cooperation with welfare religious organisations includes individuals' cooperation in terms of propagating the role of welfare religious organisations in society, providing logistic and financial support to these organisations, and the intensity of social pressure for these organisations. Likewise, cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations is the sum of individuals' preferences to propagate the role of religious organisations in society, provide logistic and financial support to these organisations and the intensity of social pressure for these organisations. Our data shows that, in post-conflict life, cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations is more in Buner while cooperation with welfare religious organisation is more in Swat. This implies that conflict enhances cooperation with welfare-related organisations as compared non-welfare organisations.

In addition to the main variable of interest, i.e. conflict, we control for economic, demographic, and some other variables. Economic controls include the income and employment status of the head of households. Income is measured as the total monthly earnings of the households. The employment status is assessed by a dummy variable, which assumes 1 for employed household head and 0 otherwise. The demographic controls include, the age (in years), education (in years), marital status (the dummy variable, equal 1 for married individuals and 0 otherwise) of the head of households, and the total household size. The other covariates include the location of residence, which is the dummy variable and takes the values of 1 for households in urban zone and zero otherwise. Moreover, the distance from the border to the conflict zones, measured in kilometres, is also incorporated in order to capture the differences in the exposure to conflict. The descriptive statistics show that the average values of education, income and household size is higher in Swat as compared to Buner; however, the average of age is higher in Buner. Additionally, on average, more respondents are employed, married and living in urban areas in Buner as compared to Swat.

3.2. Identification Strategy

As stated earlier, Swat is the treated group while Buner is the corresponding control group. The two districts have protracted history and share various common characteristics. First, the population of both the districts are dominated by the Yousafzai

tribe. Second, both the districts remained part of the Yousafzai State of Swat from 1915-1969, where they were ruled by a Monarch family and their social, political, and economic structures were significantly shaped by the state's formal institutions.⁷ Third, when in 1969, Swat state emerged into Pakistan; Buner remained part of the district Swat till 1991. Despite the shared history, district Buner is largely unaffected by the Swat conflict. Thus, the protracted history on both sides of the border and the unaffected structure of district Buner allow us to identify it as a control group. However, it is important to mention that, after the peace agreement in Swat, militants violated the agreement and attempted to suppress the writ of the state in neighbouring districts. Therefore, they entered into the *Daggar* tehsil of Buner through the hilly areas.⁸ However, unlike Swat, they faced stiff resistance from the local population. The *Peace Lashkar* (Citizens Militia) with the support of paramilitary *Frontier Corps* (FC) pushed the militant back to Swat. Nevertheless, such conflict was limited, short term, and lower in intensity. Yet, to form a precise counterfactual, we drop those villages of Daggar tehsil, where the militants showed their presence. Additionally, to support our claim that both the districts are similar in control characteristics, we apply the paired t-test. The paired t-test, also referred to as dependent sample t-test, is applied to determine whether the mean difference between the two sets of observations is same in the two related groups, measured at two different points of time or under different circumstances. Moreover, it is generally perceived that comparing the trends of covariates of the control and treated groups in post-conflict setting might be difficult. To resolve this concern, we conduct robustness check by using the data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) for the year 2007-08. The findings of these tests are reported in tables A3 to A5 in the appendix. In Table A3, the probability values ($\Pr(|T| > |t|)$) associated to each variable are greater than 0.1, which suggest that their covariates are balanced in 2007-08.⁹ Similarly, the probability values ($\Pr(|T| > |t|)$) in tables A4 and A5 are greater than 0.1 for each variable, which suggest that their covariates remain similar in 2010 and 2018 as well. Thus, the households across the border are homogenous, we can reliably interpret the causal impact of conflict on religious preferences.

3.3. Estimation Technique

The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) appears to be more appropriate for estimation as our data is cross sectional and the outcome variables are continuous. Several other studies have applied OLS while examining the socio-economic impacts of violent conflicts (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016; Grosjean, 2014; Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Collier, 1999). OLS is flexible enough to capture the treatment effect of any intervention; however, it might give us biased estimates, especially if we ignore any potential selection with respect to violence. For instance, the survivors' bias and displacement might

⁷For detail discussion see also Rome (2008).

⁸According to reports of the local administration, the militants showed their presence in *Ghazikhanai, Sultanwas, Gookand, and Shalbandai* villages of Daggar tehsil.

⁹It is important to note that from PSLM data set, we can only compare the pre-conflict trend of the covariates of the households in two districts, however, we cannot compare their magnitude with our post-conflict covariates because of different sample size and households' selection.

influence OLS estimates. We control for migration in our regression. Also, we have a variety of households in our sample which are from different locations of the conflict zone, therefore, we have households' information that experienced lives loss in the conflict. Our model takes the following form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \theta^y \sum Z_i + U_i \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad (1)$$

Y_i shows religious preferences. D_i is dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the household is located in the treated zone, i.e., the households that are exposed to violent conflict, and 0 otherwise. β_1 , thus, captures the intensity of change in religious preferences as a results of conflict. Z_i is the set of control characteristics of the households. U_i is the corresponding error term. We estimate equation 1 for the year 2010 (the period right after the conflict), and 2018 (nine years after the conflict). In this way, we want to assess the persistency in religious preferences, when the underlined structure is exposed to a violent shock.¹⁰ We might have potential threats to the underlined causal relationship due to omitted variable bias, measurement error, and reverse causality. We attempt to control the omitted variable bias by including all the potential covariates in the model. Similarly, to overcome the measurement error, we ensure randomisation in the data to avoid specific class of individuals. Additionally, to overcome the problem of reverse causality, as more rigid religious views might promote conflict, we resort to the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD).

RDD is a quasi-experimental strategy that captures the causal effects of any intervention by determining a cutoff, below or above which an intervention is assigned. Unlike the OLS, the RDD allow us to capture the heterogeneity in exposure to violence for the treated group. Different studies have used RDD to capture the diverse effects of policies and interventions (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Van der Klaauw, 2002). A special form of RDD is Spatial RDD (SRDD) which considers the location of areas, where the threshold is the boundary that demarcates two areas. In this study, we use the SRDD to capture the heterogeneity in terms of the effects on religious preferences due to conflict. A number of studies have used SRDD to assess various issues like quality compensation for teachers on students' performance in various districts of US (Moor, 2005), labour market dynamics of the wage differential in different zones in Italy (de Blasio and Poy, 2014), and housing prices and school attendance across the boundaries of US districts (Bayer et al. 2007). Additionally, the assumptions of SRDD are satisfied in our case: First, the households in the two districts are identical; second, the districts are separated by formal boundary, which is exogenous and truly random in nature, i.e., independent of conflict; third, the conflict was exogenous as it was motivated by an organised militants groups.

Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts the boundary line that divides the two districts. After conflict, the local administration divided the district Swat into three parts: moderately affected, highly affected, and least affected. They have made this classification on the basis of intensity of violence in the areas. They declared area from border to 44km as moderately affected. In this area, the militants attempted violent

¹⁰The institutional data of the 2010 is collected through recalling. Various surveys follow the same approach, for instance Life in Transition Survey (LITS) adopt the recalling approach for collecting various forms of data in post-war life.

activities; however, they were not succeeded to establish their writ due to the presence of military and security check posts, and formation of effective security strategies that blocked the entry of militants. Likewise, the area from 45km to 60km to the border was declared as the highly affected area. In this area, the militants established headquarter, where they operated illegal FM radio, executed opponents, established militants training camps and Sharia courts as parallel judicial system. Accordingly, during the military operation, this area was the most challenging part as the militants had captured all the strategically important locations. Finally, the area from 61km to 93km was declared as the least affected area. This area was relatively peaceful due to the informal peace agreement between the *Jirga* (Counsel of Leaders) and militants. Alternatively, the local population was willing to comply with the Sharia rules of the militants. We estimate the following regressions for the treated and control groups respectively.

$$Y_t = \alpha_t + \beta_t (X - b) + \varepsilon_t \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad (2)$$

$$Y_c = \alpha_c + \beta_c (X - b) + \varepsilon_c \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad \dots \quad (3)$$

Y is, again, the set of religious preferences. Where, α_t and α_c are the intercepts of the regressions in the treated and control districts, respectively. b is the border line, while $(X - b)$ is the distance from the border line to the districts' localities where the data is collected. By estimating the above regressions, the impact of violent conflict on religious preferences can be computed through the difference between the intercepts α_t and α_c of the two regression lines. However, to avoid the complications, we use the pooled version of the Equations (1) and (2), presented by Lee and Lemieux (2010). Let $\tau = \alpha_t - \alpha_c$ and the dummy variable D , which equal 1 for the treated district (Swat) and 0 for control district (Buner), the pooled equation is of the following form.

$$Y = \alpha_0 + \tau D + (\beta_t - \beta_c)(X - b) + (\beta_t - \beta_c) D (X - b) + \theta^y \sum Z_i + \varepsilon \quad \dots \quad (4)$$

Our parameter of interest is τ , which shows the average treatment effect on the treated district and can be interpreted as the jump between the two regression lines on the border.

4. ESTIMATION RESULTS

In this section, we provide the empirical findings of our study. First, we discuss the impact of conflict on individuals' basic religious rituals, religious humanistic values, and alternative forms of trust. Onwards, we explain the effect of conflict on participation and cooperation of the individuals in various religion related activities and organisations.

4.1. Conflict, Fundamental Rituals, Humanistic Values, and Religious Trust

Table 1 report the OLS results in case of fundamental rituals, humanistic values, and various forms of religious trust. Panels A and B of the table exhibit the 2010 and 2018 estimates, respectively. As is visible from the table, conflict strengthens basic rituals. For instance, right after the conflict, the observance of basic rituals among the conflict affected individuals is higher by 0.583 percentage points as compared to non-victims (see panel A of the table). Similarly, after nine years of the conflict, conflict affected individuals still show higher preference for basic rituals as compared to the non-

Table 1

Conflict, Fundamental Rituals, Humanistic Values, and Religious Trust (OLS)

Panel A (Data of 2010)						
Variables	Fundamental Rituals	Humanistic Values	Trust on Religious Seminaries	Trust on Religious Figures	Trust on Welfare Religious Organisations	Trust on Religious Organisations
Conflict	0.583*** (0.027)	0.592*** (0.041)	-0.834*** (0.047)	-0.748*** (0.049)	0.646*** (0.052)	-0.888*** (0.050)
Displacement	0.036 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.045)	0.021 (0.049)	-0.012 (0.052)	0.003 (0.057)	0.041 (0.051)
Region Dummy	0.017 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.048 (0.035)	0.007 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.039)	0.055 (0.040)
Constant	1.380*** (0.211)	2.261*** (0.303)	2.771*** (0.329)	1.767*** (0.372)	2.133*** (0.397)	1.633*** (0.385)
Observations	800	800	800	800	800	800
R-squared	0.553	0.338	0.427	0.357	0.276	0.390
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B (Data of 2018)						
Conflict	0.456*** (0.029)	0.507*** (0.038)	-0.651*** (0.047)	-0.600*** (0.046)	0.515*** (0.050)	-0.721*** (0.048)
Displacement	0.016 (0.030)	-0.042 (0.041)	-0.000 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.051)	-0.045 (0.054)	0.045 (0.048)
Region Dummy	-0.003 (0.021)	0.007 (0.028)	0.006 (0.036)	0.008 (0.037)	0.024 (0.038)	0.035 (0.037)
Constant	1.212*** (0.300)	3.029*** (0.411)	3.262*** (0.539)	2.828*** (0.538)	2.637*** (0.551)	2.928*** (0.552)
Observations	800	800	800	800	800	800
R-squared	0.410	0.283	0.311	0.289	0.178	0.312
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

affected. Alternatively, in terms of the observance of rituals, the difference between the conflict affected and non-affected individuals is still 0.456 percentage points. Shocks deeply penetrate in individuals' life which substantially escalates their level of religiosity.¹¹ Our findings are supported by the cultural evolutionary theory which suggests that the likelihood of external threats or uncertainty induces individuals to adhere firmly to their social customs, including their religious beliefs and practices. In other words, people are attracted to rituals or ritualised practices as a mean to deal with anxiety or traumatic experiences (Saab et al. 2003; Henrich et al. 2019).¹²

Similarly, our results show that conflict enhances religious humanistic values. Panel A of Table 1 shows that, right after the conflict, the difference between the conflict exposed and non-exposed individuals, in terms of following religious humanistic values, is 0.592 percentage points. This preference is persistent over time as the difference is still 0.507 percentage points after nine years of the conflict (see panel B of the same table). This finding is supported by the theories related to the commitments to God, divine protection, and beliefs of compassion (McNamara et al. 2016; Purzycki et al. 2016). These theories encourage the formation of supportive groups at the individuals and societal level, which aim to strengthen the social connections and mutual support (Henrich et al. 2019). Accordingly, conflict promotes social support and humanistic values in a society. Also, conflicts make investment in human and physical capital risky, expensive and constrained, in addition to destroying household assets. Alternatively, the sufferers become reliant on the informal setup of risk sharing through investment in social capital. Such type of risk sharing, in turn, promotes social interactions and support (Bauer et al. 2016).

With respect to alternative form of trust, conflict reduces trust on religious seminaries, religious figures, and general religious organisations; however, it enhances trust on welfare religious organisations. Right after the conflict, the trust on religious seminaries reduces, on average, by 0.834 percentage points among the treated individuals as compared to the controlled. Though, nine years after the conflict, there has been some improvement in trust on religious seminaries; still the conflict exposed individuals trust less on these seminaries as compared to the non-exposed. Alternatively, the difference between the exposed and non-exposed individuals is still 0.651 percentage points. Religious seminaries are unregulated in Pakistan which, in some way, results in promoting militancy in the country (Singer, 2001; Haqqani, 2002). For instance, majority of the Jihadi groups are graduates of these seminaries and their violent activities are trustily linked to their learning institutions.¹³ Consequently, all such happenings adversely affect the trust of common people on religious seminaries in the conflict affected zones.

As far as trust on religious figures is concerned; it is lower by 0.748 percentage points among the conflict affected individuals as compared to the non-affected. Moreover, this effect is persistent over time, i.e. after nine years of the conflict, it is still

¹¹See also Van Biema et al. 2001.

¹²During stressful life events methods of religious coping are among the most common forms of coping strategies. For detail see also Pargament et al. (1990).

¹³Various reports of International Crises Group (ICG) takes the nexus between militancy and religious organisations as an established relationship.

lower, on average, by 0.60 percentage points in the treated district. The religious figures, guided by their matching ideological preferences with the militants, usually adopt various strategies that support the non-state warring groups. For instance, supporting recruitment or sympathies for insurgent groups or producing literature in support of militant groups are some of the instances in this regard (Faith, 2018). Likewise, their teachings are usually apolitical that not only promote violence but also refrain political development in the region. All of such activities create inverse perceptions in individuals which, in turn, decline trust on religious figures in post-conflict life.

The trust on general religious organisations declines in post-conflict life. For instance, trust on such organisation is lower by 0.888 percentage points among the conflict exposed individuals as compared to the non-exposed. This effect is persistent over time as the difference between the non-exposed and exposed is still 0.721 points. Usually, religious organisations extend their support for the ideology of non-state actors by inciting individuals to support the militants and attaching divine significance to their deeds (Azam, 2010; Howenstein, 2006).¹⁴ Such suspicious and unfair behaviour of such organisations, thus, reduces trust on them, especially, in post-conflict life. Unlike general religious organisations, conflict has beneficial effects on welfare religious organisations. Immediately after the conflict, trust on welfare religious organisations is 0.646 percentage points higher in conflict affected zones as compared to the non-affected zones. Again, the effect is persistent over time, i.e., after nine years after the conflict, the difference between the non-affected and affected zones is still 0.515 percentage points. After the conflict, various religious organisations (mainly political in nature, such as *Al-Khidmat* foundation and *Ummah Welfare Trust of Jama'at-i-Islami* and *Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam*, respectively) participated in rehabilitation process in Swat. In general, religious political parties participate in welfare related programs as forms of patronage politics, distributing free services primarily with a view to gain support of the common individuals (Rosenblum, 2003; Bano, 2009). However, as providers of public goods, their active participation in the rehabilitation process elevate the level of trust of the exposed individuals on such organisations.

Furthermore, the overall results in Table 1 show that the displacement variable appears insignificant, which suggests that forced migration during the operation has no effect on religious preferences. This might be due the reasons that migration occurred for a short period of time and largely limited to the same province. Likewise, the region dummy appears insignificant in all specifications, which suggests that the effects of conflict equally penetrates in the behaviours of urban and rural individuals.

OLS provides a combine treatment effect, while ignoring the heterogeneity in impacts across differently exposed individuals. In reality, different people in the treated district were exposed differently to the conflict. To examine, such heterogeneity, we resort to the SRDD estimates. These results are shown in Table 2, which confirm heterogeneity across different locations. However, in all of the specifications, the SRDD estimates support the findings of OLS. As is visible from panel A of the table, the magnitude of observance of the basic rituals among the highly exposed individuals is

¹⁴Nevertheless, in some cases the religious groups remain neutral, neither condemn nor support militant groups' actions (Howenstein, 2006).

Table 2

Conflict, Fundamental Rituals, Humanistic Values, and Religious Trust (SRDD)

Panel A (Data of 2010)									
Variables	Fundamental Rituals			Humanistic Values			Trust on Religious Seminaries		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
Conflict	0.158*** (0.010)	0.188*** (0.016)	0.126*** (0.011)	0.167*** (0.014)	0.233*** (0.026)	0.117*** (0.013)	-0.232*** (0.020)	-0.270*** (0.022)	-0.180*** (0.017)
Displacement	0.034 (0.032)	0.032 (0.066)	0.024 (0.048)	-0.026 (0.052)	-0.097 (0.127)	0.024 (0.055)	0.099 (0.069)	-0.065 (0.106)	0.054 (0.073)
Border Distance	0.004** (0.002)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.007)	0.005** (0.002)
Constant	1.411*** (0.286)	0.147 (0.490)	1.569*** (0.334)	2.387*** (0.427)	0.077 (0.758)	2.168*** (0.466)	3.683*** (0.489)	3.340*** (0.830)	2.688*** (0.573)
R-squared	0.568	0.712	0.530	0.387	0.557	0.363	0.430	0.647	0.427
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables	Trust on Religious Figures			Trust on Welfare Religious Organisations			Trust on Religious Organisations		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
Conflict	-0.203*** (0.022)	-0.259*** (0.021)	-0.158*** (0.014)	0.191*** (0.020)	0.231*** (0.030)	0.142*** (0.019)	-0.234*** (0.022)	-0.323*** (0.024)	-0.178*** (0.017)
Displacement	0.016 (0.079)	0.074 (0.108)	0.008 (0.061)	0.004 (0.070)	-0.018 (0.137)	-0.003 (0.088)	0.111 (0.071)	0.042 (0.104)	0.033 (0.075)
Border Distance	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.008)	0.002 (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.009)	-0.004* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.003)
Constant	2.541*** (0.569)	3.083*** (0.861)	1.416*** (0.536)	2.032*** (0.558)	0.839 (0.875)	1.978*** (0.693)	2.319*** (0.572)	2.654*** (0.919)	1.685*** (0.629)
R-squared	0.343	0.549	0.413	0.360	0.491	0.269	0.354	0.651	0.377
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Continued-

Table 2—(Continued)

Variables	Panel B (Data of 2018)								
	Fundamental Rituals			Humanistic Values			Trust on Religious Seminaries		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
Conflict	0.118*** (0.012)	0.148*** (0.016)	0.107*** (0.011)	0.143*** (0.014)	0.196*** (0.025)	0.103*** (0.012)	-0.174*** (0.019)	-0.216*** (0.024)	-0.149*** (0.017)
Displacement	0.021 (0.042)	-0.029 (0.072)	0.013 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.051)	-0.090 (0.119)	-0.032 (0.052)	0.029 (0.068)	0.030 (0.114)	0.012 (0.072)
Border Distance	0.003* (0.002)	0.009** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.006)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.006)	0.004* (0.002)
Constant	1.003** (0.448)	0.757 (0.766)	1.256*** (0.469)	2.318*** (0.609)	1.906* (1.001)	3.434*** (0.600)	3.449*** (0.757)	5.666*** (1.125)	3.387*** (0.881)
R-squared	0.364	0.565	0.461	0.311	0.500	0.318	0.346	0.536	0.347
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables	Trust on Religious Figures			Trust on Welfare Religious Organisations			Trust on Religious Organisations		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
	Conflict	-0.172*** (0.021)	-0.206*** (0.019)	-0.120*** (0.014)	0.153*** (0.021)	0.176*** (0.024)	0.109*** (0.019)	-0.192*** (0.022)	-0.257*** (0.025)
Displacement	-0.010 (0.075)	-0.037 (0.100)	-0.074 (0.064)	-0.066 (0.076)	0.094 (0.108)	-0.070 (0.084)	0.127* (0.074)	0.022 (0.107)	-0.039 (0.068)
Border Distance	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.031*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.002)
Constant	2.445*** (0.788)	6.577*** (1.320)	2.972*** (0.830)	1.216 (0.824)	2.952** (1.207)	2.638*** (0.846)	2.628*** (0.831)	7.260*** (1.207)	2.837*** (0.907)
R-squared	0.302	0.522	0.301	0.222	0.449	0.167	0.251	0.594	0.290
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

0.188 and 0.148 in 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.158 and 0.118 for moderately, and 0.126 and 0.107 for least affected individuals. Likewise, the magnitude of religious humanistic values among the highly exposed individuals is 0.223 and 0.196 in 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.167 and 0.143 for moderately, and 0.117 and 0.103 for least affected individuals. This implies that individuals in highly exposed locations observe more rituals and humanistic values as compared to the moderately and least exposed locations.

With respect to trust on religious seminaries, the decline in trust in highly exposed locations is 0.27 and 0.216 points for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.232 and 0.174 for the moderately exposed and 0.180 and 0.149 for the least exposed locations. Similar is the case with trust on religious figures, i.e. the decline in trust on religious figures in highly exposed locations is 0.259 and 0.206 points for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.203 and 0.172 for the moderately exposed and 0.158 and 0.120 for the least exposed locations. Furthermore, the reduction in trust on non-welfare religious organisations for highly affected locations is 0.323 and 0.257 points in 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.234 and 0.192 points for moderately and 0.178 and 0.131 for least affected locations. All these results suggest that the effect of conflict on trust on religious seminaries, religious figures and general religious organisations is higher in highly exposed locations as compared to moderately and least exposed locations. Finally, panels A and panel B of Table 2 show that, in both 2010 and 2018, the highly exposed individuals show higher average trust (0.231, 0.176) on welfare religious organisations, as compared to moderately (0.191, 0.153), and least affected (0.142, 0.109) individuals. Thus, as we proceed to the conflict affected areas, the trust on welfare religious organisations significantly increases; however, for furthest region of the district, such affect declines.

4.2. Conflict, Religious Participation and Cooperation

In Table 3, we report the OLS results in case of religious participation. In addition, the table also depicts results with respect to cooperation. Overall, the results show that conflict promotes participation and cooperation with respect to welfare religious organisations; however, it retards participation in and cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations. Also, conflict discourages participation in religious gatherings. As is visible from panel A of the table, right after the conflict, participation in religious gatherings is lower by 0.680 percentage points among the conflict exposed individuals as compared to the non-exposed. This effect is persistent over time, i.e. it is still lower by 0.564 percentage points among the conflict affected individuals even after nine years of the conflict. Conflicts usually have multidimensional effects on religious preferences. For instance, Calhoun et al. (2000) finds that exposure to trauma strengthens the religious beliefs. Our results are consistent with Falsetti et al. (2003) who finds adverse impact of conflict on religious beliefs. Shocks result in spiritual discontent, interpersonal religious restlessness, and demonic reappraisals (Pargament et al. 1990).¹⁵

¹⁵See also, Schwartzberg and Janoff-Bulman, (1991); Saab et al. (2003); Ben-Ezra et al. (2010), in this regard.

Table 3

Conflict, Religious Participation and Cooperation (OLS)

Panel A (Data of 2010)					
Variables	Participation in Religious Gathering	Participation in Welfare Religious Organisations	Participation in Religious Organisations	Cooperation with Welfare Religious Organisations	Cooperation with Religious Organisations
Conflict	-0.680*** (0.046)	0.648*** (0.029)	-0.451*** (0.041)	0.478*** (0.041)	-0.652*** (0.052)
Displacement	0.027 (0.048)	0.013 (0.030)	-0.043 (0.046)	0.029 (0.044)	-0.049 (0.060)
Region Dummy	0.031 (0.036)	0.008 (0.022)	0.005 (0.031)	0.012 (0.032)	-0.018 (0.040)
Constant	2.629*** (0.334)	2.264*** (0.226)	1.536*** (0.298)	2.595*** (0.327)	2.332*** (0.394)
Observations	800	800	800	800	800
R-squared	0.323	0.532	0.252	0.247	0.286
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B (Data of 2018)					
Conflict	-0.564*** (0.046)	0.502*** (0.036)	-0.362*** (0.037)	0.323*** (0.050)	-0.524*** (0.049)
Displacement	0.016 (0.049)	0.005 (0.040)	-0.033 (0.041)	0.043 (0.054)	-0.051 (0.056)
Region Dummy	0.018 (0.036)	0.024 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.029)	0.035 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.038)
Constant	3.131*** (0.528)	2.301*** (0.378)	1.978*** (0.426)	3.278*** (0.511)	2.992*** (0.556)
Observations	800	800	800	800	800
R-squared	0.244	0.319	0.192	0.131	0.222
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Similarly, exposure to conflict enhances individuals' participation in welfare religious organisations by 0.648 percentage points as compared to the non-exposed. Again, there is persistency in this effect as, after nine years of the conflict, participation in welfare religious organisations is still lower by 0.502 percentage points among the conflict affected individuals as compared to the non-affected. Likewise, conflict enhances individuals' cooperation with welfare religious organisations. For instance, individuals' cooperation with welfare religious organisations is higher by 0.478 percentage points among the conflict exposed individuals, compared to the non-exposed. The effect remains persistent over time as it is still higher by 0.323 percentage points even after nine years of the conflict. Welfare religious organisations attract individuals' confidence by providing different services in post-conflict life (Salamon and Teitelbaum, 1985).¹⁶ Also, such organisations usually provide public goods in affected societies (Rosenblum, 2003; Bano, 2009). Hence, the constructive role of such organisations attracts individuals in battle-scarred areas to participate in and cooperate with more in their welfare related activities.

With respect to non-welfare religious organisations, conflict discourages participation in those organisations which solely focus on religious preaching. We find that participation in non-welfare religious organisations is lower among the conflict-exposed individuals by 0.451 percentage points compared to the non-exposed. Again, this effect is prevalent after nine years of the conflict, i.e. it is still lower by 0.362 percentage points among the treated group. Similarly, conflict retards cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations. Similarly, individuals' cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations is lower by 0.652 percentage points in conflict affected areas as compared to the non-affected areas. This effect is prevalent even after nine years of the conflict, i.e. it is still lower by 0.524 percentage points in 2018. In general, significant fraction of non-welfare religious groups and organisations adopt extreme interpretation of religious teachings or promote radicalisation which, in turn, discourages individuals' participation in and cooperation with the activities of religious organisations (Alexiev, 2005; Azam, 2010). Especially, in conflict affected zones, individuals avoid such activities to reduce the risk of victimisation. Again, in all of the specifications, the displacement could not influence the above dimensions of religious preferences. Whereas, the insignificant region dummy suggests that the effects of conflict equally prevailed across the urban and rural regions.

With respect to heterogeneity across locations, Table 4 shows that there is heterogeneity across different locations as far as the effect of conflict on religion-based participation and cooperation is concerned. For instance, with regard to participation in religious gatherings, the decline for highly exposed locations is 0.238 and 0.198 for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.182 and 0.153 for the moderately exposed and 0.156 and 0.113 for the least exposed locations. Likewise, the decline in participation in non-welfare religious organisations for highly exposed locations is 0.167 and 0.132 for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.119 and 0.092 for the moderately exposed and 0.106 and 0.088 for the least exposed locations. In contrast, the increase in participation in welfare religious organisations for highly affected areas is 0.190 and

¹⁶Salamon and Teitelbaum (1985) noted three forms of welfare activities of such organisations, i.e. provision of direct services, donating cash or in-kind assistance, and raising funds for various events.

Table 4

Conflict, Religious Participation and Cooperation (SRDD)

Variables	Panel A								
	Participation in Religious Gatherings			Participation in Welfare Religious Organisations			Participation in Religious Organisations		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
Conflict	-0.182*** (0.019)	-0.238*** (0.018)	-0.156*** (0.017)	0.174*** (0.012)	0.190*** (0.016)	0.145*** (0.011)	-0.119*** (0.017)	-0.167*** (0.021)	-0.106*** (0.013)
Displacement	0.091 (0.064)	-0.022 (0.083)	0.062 (0.070)	0.027 (0.041)	0.026 (0.069)	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.073 (0.061)	0.010 (0.104)	0.064 (0.059)
Border Distance	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.007)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.030*** (0.006)	0.004** (0.002)
Constant	3.524*** (0.494)	2.760*** (0.782)	2.915*** (0.569)	2.174*** (0.332)	1.037* (0.528)	2.176*** (0.378)	2.106*** (0.450)	2.291*** (0.724)	1.594*** (0.472)
R-squared	0.336	0.598	0.352	0.529	0.671	0.518	0.292	0.517	0.264
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables	Cooperation with Welfare Religious Organisations			Cooperation with Religious Organisations					
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth					
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)			
	Conflict	0.138*** (0.016)	0.157*** (0.030)	0.104*** (0.014)	-0.182*** (0.023)	-0.242*** (0.024)	-0.145*** (0.015)		
Displacement	-0.004 (0.053)	0.089 (0.138)	0.079 (0.058)	-0.065 (0.082)	0.068 (0.127)	0.050 (0.067)			
Border Distance	0.005** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.036*** (0.008)	0.002 (0.002)			
Constant	3.128*** (0.462)	0.087 (0.876)	2.095*** (0.509)	3.038*** (0.605)	3.814*** (0.991)	2.500*** (0.515)			
R-squared	0.281	0.403	0.314	0.346	0.506	0.340			
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287			
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			

Continued-

Table 4—(Continued)

Variables	Panel B								
	Participation in Religious Gatherings			Participation in Welfare Religious Organisations			Participation in Religious Organisations		
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth			Bandwidth		
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)
Conflict	-0.153*** (0.020)	-0.198*** (0.017)	-0.113*** (0.017)	0.127*** (0.016)	0.151*** (0.018)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.092*** (0.016)	-0.132*** (0.018)	-0.088*** (0.013)
Displacement	0.050 (0.067)	0.047 (0.088)	0.007 (0.067)	0.049 (0.057)	-0.006 (0.086)	-0.061 (0.064)	-0.082 (0.059)	-0.040 (0.098)	0.080 (0.056)
Border Distance	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.006)	0.006** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.024*** (0.005)	0.004** (0.002)
Constant	3.025*** (0.768)	5.577*** (1.219)	3.571*** (0.795)	1.761*** (0.584)	0.802 (0.934)	2.732*** (0.605)	1.700*** (0.618)	3.124*** (1.003)	2.810*** (0.699)
R-squared	0.290	0.493	0.254	0.308	0.487	0.335	0.205	0.443	0.199
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287	348	165	287
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables	Cooperation with Welfare Religious Organisations			Cooperation with Religious Organisations					
	Bandwidth			Bandwidth					
	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)	[10-44km] (Model 1)	[45-60km] (Model 2)	[61-93km] (Model 3)			
	Conflict	0.098*** (0.020)	0.112*** (0.026)	0.090*** (0.016)	-0.146*** (0.021)	-0.223*** (0.024)	-0.096*** (0.015)		
Displacement	0.050 (0.072)	0.116 (0.122)	0.011 (0.076)	-0.081 (0.074)	0.201 (0.127)	-0.037 (0.068)			
Border Distance	0.016*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.007)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.007)	0.005** (0.002)			
Constant	2.228*** (0.707)	2.062 (1.258)	4.104*** (0.778)	2.041** (0.844)	5.297*** (1.249)	4.258*** (0.769)			
R-squared	0.223	0.317	0.202	0.282	0.513	0.241			
Observations	348	165	287	348	165	287			
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

0.151 for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.174 and 0.127 for moderately affected and 0.145 and 0.115 for the least affected areas. Thus, with respect to participation, the impact of conflict is higher in highly exposed locations as compared to the moderately and least affected locations.


With respect to cooperation, right after the conflict, individuals in highly exposed locations exhibit relatively high average cooperation with welfare religious organisations (0.157) compared to the moderately (0.138) and least affected (0.104) locations. There is consistency in this pattern even after nine years of the conflict, i.e. still the increase in cooperation with welfare religious organisation is 0.112 in highly exposed areas compared to 0.098 in moderately affected and 0.090 in least affected areas. Likewise, the decline in cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations for highly exposed locations is 0.242 and 0.223 for 2010 and 2018, respectively as compared to 0.182 and 0.146 for the moderately exposed and 0.145 and 0.096 for the least exposed locations. Thus, with respect to cooperation, the impact of conflict is higher in highly exposed locations as compared to the moderately and least affected locations.

5. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to inquire the response of religious preferences to a conflict that took place in district Swat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan. The conflict erupted between the state forces and militants in the district when the latter group started an armed struggle in the valley to impose Sharia laws on the inhabitants by force. The violent episode, which continued for many years and followed the religious dimensions, provided us an interesting situation to explore its impact on religious preferences of individuals in post-conflict life. To do such an inquiry, we focus on various dimensions of religious preferences, like fundamental rituals, religious humanistic values, the religious trust, participation, and cooperation. Additionally, to search causal impact, we identify Buner as a control district. Buner shares boundary, history and socio-economic characteristics with district Swat, so, it is a useful control group. We take primary data from 400 households in each district and use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design (SRDD) for estimation. We find that the occurrence of violent shock in the form of civil conflict enhances the level of fundamental rituals and religious humanistic values. With regard to trust, the exposure to conflict adversely affect trust in religious seminaries, religious figures and non-welfare religious organisations; however, it improves trust in welfare religious organisations. As far as participation is concerned, conflict lowers participation in religious ceremonies and non-welfare religious organisations; however, it stimulates participation in welfare religious organisations. Finally, conflict discourages cooperation with non-welfare religious organisations; however, it enhances cooperation with welfare religious organisations. Additionally, while supporting the OLS findings, the SRDD estimates exhibit that the effect is heterogeneous across different locations. The individuals in highly exposed locations experience higher changes in fundamental rituals, religious humanistic values, trust, participation, and cooperation as compared to the individuals in the moderately and least exposed locations.

Appendix

Fig. A1. Districts Wise Map



Source: Refugee Review Tribunal (2009).

Table A1

Descriptive Statistics (2010)

Variables	Swat				Buner			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Fundamental Rituals	2.676	0.265	2	3.166	2.067	0.291	1.166	2.833
Humanistic Values	3.001	0.433	1.714	4	2.423	0.388	1.286	3.571
Trust on Religious Seminaries	2.157	0.451	1	3.333	2.973	0.508	2	4
Trust on Religious Figures	2.449	0.507	1	4	3.202	0.548	1.667	4
Trust on Welfare Religious Organisations	3.140	0.545	1	4	2.490	0.536	1	4
Trust on Religious Organisations	2.307	0.485	1	3.667	3.157	0.626	1.667	4
Participation in Religious Gatherings	2.324	0.459	1.25	3.5	2.982	0.522	2	4
Participation in Welfare Religious Organisations	2.675	0.288	2	3	2.019	0.329	1.000	3
Participation in Religious Organisations	1.825	0.451	0.667	3	2.302	0.412	1	3
Cooperation with Welfare Religious Organisations	3.130	0.423	2	4	2.633	0.453	1.333	4
Cooperation with Religious Organisations	2.519	0.596	1	4	3.205	0.517	1.667	4
Income of Household	30242.5	13592.62	10000	47000	29687.5	13051.42	5000	51000
Employment	0.54	0.499	0	1	0.565	0.496	0	1
Education	13.765	2.996	0	18	13.4225	2.991	0	18
Respondent Age	36.255	6.815	26	56	35.4525	7.539	25	50
Marital Status	0.55	0.498	0	1	0.5875	0.492	0	1
Household Size	8.5	2.210	3	11	8.29	2.596	2	14
Residence Location	0.4575	0.498	0	1	0.4025	0.491	0	1

Note: Author's Own Calculations. The Total Number of Observation are 400 for Each District.

Table A2

Descriptive Statistics (2018)

Variables	Swat				Buner			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Fundamental Rituals	2.510	0.291	1.666	3.166	2.04	0.285	1.166	2.833
Humanistic Values	2.819	0.397	1.714	4	2.340	0.377	1.143	3.571
Trust on Religious Seminaries	2.433	0.500	1	4	3.086	0.492	2	4
Trust on Religious Figures	2.662	0.506	1	4	3.297	0.507	2	4
Trust on Welfare Religious Organisations	2.828	0.529	1	4	2.340	0.536	1	4
Trust on Religious Organisations	2.563	0.459	1	4	3.252	0.571	1.667	4
Participation in Religious Gatherings	2.519	0.467	1.25	3.75	3.071	0.519	2	4
Participation in Welfare Religious Organisations	2.41	0.385	1.333	3	1.908	0.367	1	3
Participation in Religious Organisations	1.984	0.403	0.667	3	2.365	0.394	1.333	3
Cooperation with Welfare Religious Organisations	2.853	0.512	1	4	2.501	0.467	1.333	4
Cooperation with Religious Organisations	2.719	0.563	1.333	4	3.277	0.491	2	4
Income of Household	41352.5	13561.64	17000	62000	40245	13923.89	13000	64000
Employment	0.585	0.493	0	1	0.627	0.484	0	1
Education	13.922	3.450	0	19	13.735	3.093	1	19
Respondents Age	46.112	6.815	36	66	45.362	7.519	35	60
Marital Status	0.752	0.432	0	1	0.762	0.426	0	1
Household Size	12.5	2.210	7	15	12.297	2.600	6	18
Residence Location	0.457	0.498	0	1	0.402	0.491	0	1

Note: Author's Own Calculations. The Total Number of Observation are 400 for Each District.

Table A3

Paired Sample t-test (Based on PSLM Data 2007-08)

Variables	Swat Mean	Buner Mean	Difference in Means	Combined Mean	t	Pr (T > t)
Income of Household	20808	18642	-2166	19725	-1.617	0.106
Employment	0.723	0.788	0.064	0.755	1.388	0.165
Education	10.047	9.547	-0.5	9.797	-1.203	0.229
Respondents Age	45.1	47.094	1.994	46.097	1.237	0.216
Marital Status	0.8	0.829	0.029	0.814	0.696	0.486
Household Size	8.135	7.517	-0.617	7.826	-1.545	0.123
Residence Location	0.617	0.558	-0.058	0.588	-1.100	0.271

Note: Author's Own Calculations Based on the PSLM data 2007-08.

Table A4

Paired Sample t-test (Based on 2010 Data)

Variables	Swat Mean	Buner Mean	Difference in Means	Combined Mean	t	Pr (T > t)
Income of Household	30242	29687	-555	29965	-0.589	0.556
Employment	0.54	0.565	0.025	0.552	0.710	0.477
Education	13.765	13.422	-0.342	13.593	-1.618	0.106
Respondents Age	36.255	35.452	-0.802	35.853	-1.579	0.114
Marital Status	0.55	0.587	0.037	0.568	1.070	0.284
Household Size	8.5	8.29	-0.21	8.395	-1.231	0.218
Residence Location	0.457	0.402	-0.055	0.43	-1.571	0.116
Religiosity	2.986	2.942	-0.0441	2.964	-1.183	0.237

Note: Authors' Own Calculations Based on the 2010 data.

Table A5

Paired Sample t-test (Based on 2018 Data)

Variables	Swat Mean	Buner Mean	Difference in Means	Combined Mean	t	Pr (T > t)
Income of Household	40245	41352	-1107	40798	-1.139	0.254
Employment	0.585	0.627	0.042	0.606	1.229	0.219
Education	13.922	13.737	-0.185	13.83	-0.798	0.424
Respondents Age	46.112	45.362	-0.75	45.737	-1.478	0.139
Marital Status	0.752	0.762	0.01	0.757	0.329	0.741
Household Size	12.5	12.297	-0.202	12.398	-1.186	0.235
Residence Location	0.457	0.402	-0.055	0.43	-1.571	0.116
Religiosity	2.677	2.66	-0.017	2.668	-0.468	0.639

Note: Author's Own Calculations Based on the 2018 data.

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