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Mariam Mohsin

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Mariam Mohsin
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.

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ABSTRACT

The structure versus agency debate has since long been under discussion in sociological theory and has also existed in organisational sociology for several decades. This research presents a brief analysis of the major extant work attempting to reconcile this dialectic. After an analysis of the works of Archer, Giddens, and Bourdieu, this paper uses the arguments presented in the works of Giddens and Bourdieu in acknowledgment of the importance of the unconscious mind in the context of this debate. In an attempt to present an understanding of the unconscious in the structure versus agency dialectic, this paper critiques the work of Akram (2012) and argues in favour of the use of collective unconscious instead of the personal unconscious in understanding this debate. Jung's collective unconscious is conceptualised as the portion of the unconscious mind that has not existed in an individual's personal conscious and thus is a better understanding of structure than the personal unconscious of Freud, which is more biologically than socially determined. The implications of this theoretical proposition are discussed in terms of organisational discourse. A further unpacking of the unconscious in the form of intuitional mechanisms is recommended.

Keywords: Structure, Agency, Collective Unconscious, Collective Memory

INTRODUCTION

The structure versus agency debate has remained at the heart of sociological theory in both classical and contemporary times and has continued to exist in the organisational sociology discourse since the inception of the field in the 1940s (Heugens & Lander, 2009). This debate is focused on answering how the social world functions. Is the social behaviour of humans a product of socialisation or autonomy? Do actors act autonomously, or are their actions controlled by structure? Are structures autonomous, or are they dependent on actors' choices and behaviours? These ontological questions of cause and effect seek answers to whether human behaviour is determined by human agency or by social structures. In organisational sociology, the testability of theories concerning the structure versus agency debate was enhanced majorly by the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In attempting to seek answers to this debate, the third stream of research, mostly comprising of modern social theorists, has attempted to find a point of balance between the two extreme views. Major contributions to this stream of research are the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Anthony Giddens (1979; 1984), and Margaret Archer (1995; 2000; 2003).

Using the works of these three scholars, this paper argues that the unconscious mechanism is referred to in the central conflation approaches is not acquired individually. Instead, it is a collective form of the unconscious that one has received through the social hereditary process. This paper aims to present an insight into the structure versus agency debate using the concept of the collective unconscious. Taking forward the ideas of Giddens, stipulating that structure is unconsciously internalised and manifested through an individual agency, this research attempts to unpack the unconscious processes involved in this internalisation. In this respect, it is argued that the collective unconscious plays a role in internalising structure, not through the personal unconscious but the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious does not owe its existence to personal experiences; the contents that make up the collective unconscious have never been a part of an individual's individual or personal conscious. This way, the structure gets internalised through an unconscious mechanism, owing to the hereditary processes of the collective unconscious. Hence structures are internalised through the collective unconscious that acts as an individual agency.

This paper is distributed into five substantive segments. The first section presents an introduction to extant work on collective memory and the role of the unconscious concerning structure and agency. In this section, the works of Akram (2012) and Ocasio, et al. (2015) are incorporated. While Akram's work is focused on the role of the unconscious in the structure versus agency dialectic, Ocasio, et al. (2015) attempt to employ the role of history and collective memory in a societal logic perspective. In the

later sections, the study juxtaposes the concept of history and collectivity presented by Ocasio and colleagues to Akram's notion of the unconscious and seeks to understand it in the context of structure and agency discretely. The second part dwells upon brief explanations of structure, agency, and upward and downward conflation. In this section, a brief review of extant work attempting to reconcile the structure versus agency dialectic is put forth. Similarly, the third part of the paper is an explanation of the unconscious and presents a distinction between the personal and collective unconscious. This section elucidates the reasons that enhance the relevance of the collective unconscious concerning structure versus agency debate. The fourth section connects the concept of the collective unconscious to the structure versus agency debate. In this section, an attempt is carried out to theorise the collective unconscious as a mechanism that explains the internalisation of structure and its reproduction or restructuring in the form of agency. The fifth section consists of discussion and deliberation about the potential implications of this study and presents several recommendations.

Ocasio and et al. (2015) attempt to provide a dynamic integration of historical and structural accounts of the organisational realm and use the institutional theory to support the argument that history plays a significant role in forming collective memories, which in turn acts as the influence of structure on individual agents and organisations/institutions. According to Ocasio and et al. (2015), history functions through different institutions, like family, religion, and market, etc., to constitute the social realm; however, it remains a question as to how this process of constitution of the social realm takes place. History, thus, can be understood as an important determinant of human, organisational and societal behaviours. In her book, "Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach," Archer (1995) argues about the importance of temporality and the role of history in resolving the structure versus agency debate; thus, to understand the role of the collective unconscious in the structure versus agency debate, it is important to understand the roles history and temporality play in affecting human and societal behaviours. Theories of organisational sociology have, however, not been very attentive in enunciating the role of history in discerning the conception of the collective unconscious (Clark & Rowlinson, 2 04). This negligence regarding the role of history has resulted in propounding of theories that lack reflection upon the temporalities of social phenomena (Sewell, 2005).

Ocasio and colleagues employ the institutional logic approach (Friedland & Alford, 1991) to postulate that organisations and their activities are rooted in historically created networks of meaning. These networks get their structures from sets of organising principles that deliver social actors with vocabulary for practice. The argument in their paper is that societal logics have historical limits and provide details regarding the role of history in the generation, reproduction, and transformation of societal logics. Thus, they postulate that societal logic historically formed cultural structures produced through the process of collective memory-making. They also propose that collective memory provides individuals and organisations with schemas that are exigent for effectively navigating through the social realm. Establishing the role of collective memory-making in the formation and reproduction of societal logics, Ocasio and colleagues argue that history serves as a scope condition that renders organisations contingent upon it. They suggest that to get a complete integration of logic with history, it is imperative to engage the history of logic in the process of theorising. However, they limit the effect of history

on collective memory by restraining the concept of collectivity to the society only. With the increasingly changing social trends and constantly growing integration of cultures, it would be worthwhile to expand the role of collectivity to a more general level – the species level, as suggested in the work of Jung (1936) on the collective unconscious.

Archer clarifies her perspective on the dialectic and states that her emphasis upon the unconscious and habit may not be equated with a return to the Structuralist approaches. She argues that it is the agent who acts and not structures; however, structures do have influences over the agent and his/her actions. She also explains that the case for unconscious does not imply that reflexivity, intentionality, and consciousness are not important. On the other hand, Akram's approach is dialectical and tends towards central conflation where both structure and agency have autonomy.

Akram (2012) presents a summary and critique of Archer's concept of reflexivity and morphogenetic sequence, Giddens' structuration theory, and Bourdieu's theory of habitus. She contends that Archer's concept of analytical dualism has many gaps and argues that by this ontological separation, Archer tends to rely too heavily on reflexivity. She maintains that agency has many facets. Like habits and unconscious, other than reflexivity to which, according to her, Archer pays little or no attention. She maintains that Giddens and Bourdieu present a better understanding of the structure versus agency dialectic. According to Akram, Giddens' approach of ontological integration is more consenting towards the inclusion of different forms of agency. Also, in her review of literature, she presents arguments that suggest the presence of the unconscious in Bourdieu's work even though he makes little explicit mention of it. She uses Giddens's concept of the internalisation of structure and Bourdieu's theory of habitus to present her thesis that the unconscious is the mechanism underlying the internalisation of structure. Moreover, she summarises her work with implications of the unconscious internalisation of gender as a structural force and discusses potential implications for future research.

STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND THE THEORIES OF CONFLATION

The structure is defined as the recurrent pattern of arrangements that can both limit and/or influence human choices; whereas, the agency is the ability of humans to behave as independent agents and to make their own choices, regardless of the systems in which they are embedded (Heugens & Lander, 2009).

Social structure has an effect on human agency in the forms of social norms, institutions, and practices (Heugens & Lander, 2009). In this way, most theories of structure and agency interaction refer to structure as symbolic rather than physical material systems. Notable structuralist theorists include Levi-Strauss, Saussure, Lacan, Marx, Weber, and Freud. All of these theorists have postulated in some way or another that society affects how individuals and groups understand the social world and behave within it. Structuralist theories are mostly deterministic and owe this determinism to the objectivity inherent in the ontological assumptions, leading them towards a more realist ontology (see Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Structuralist approaches seek to understand human behaviour about their relation to larger, overarching systems or patterns that they characterise as structure. Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology, Economics, and several other fields of literary interest have been using the structuralist approach of reasoning.

The fundamentals of structuralist approaches towards social science have been under criticism of post-structuralist and postmodern theorists like Foucault, Derrida, and Althusser. The fundamental difference here is ontological. Unlike structuralist approaches, these theorists owe their ontologies towards the subjective side and thus are in favour of voluntaristic behaviour and agency (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Studies using interpretivist and postmodern epistemologies are mostly critical of structuralism and argue that there is no one single objective reality; instead, realities or actualities are the product of human interpretation and social construction (Hatch & Yanow, 2008). In this view, the social world may not only be understood in terms of what can be observed but also about unobservables. Structures, in this context, are considered to be socially constructed, and human interpretation reflects agential control. The social construction and interpretation of structures affect the way individuals behave; thus, these theorists argue that agency is primary to structure.

Theoretical systems aligned with the view that the structural and hierarchical aspects of society are imperative in determining the way a society thinks and behaves include some forms of functionalism (e.g., structural functionalism), structuralism, and Marxism. While structural functionalists like Durkheim argue that structures affect human behaviours, Marx, on the contrary, emphasises that social structures act as detrimental forces towards the majority of the members of society; howsoever, both structures have primacy over the human agency. On the other hand, other theorists argue in favour of an individual's capacity in constructing the social world, regardless of how the social structure operates. These theoretical systems include Social Phenomenology, Methodological Individualism, Interactionism, and Ethnomethodology. The central issue here is the primacy of methodological holism over methodological individualism or otherwise. The first view, methodological holism, asserts that individuals are socialised and rooted into social structures that limit or enable and shape the actors' dispositions and capacities, and therefore the social structure is the primary cause of the behaviour. The second view, methodological individualism, argues that individuals are the principal ontological elements in social systems, and that structure of a social system is an epiphenomenon, a consequence of the behaviours of individual agents.

While both views enjoy substantial philosophical development and empirical support, the equivocality, rather contradiction, calls for further analysis to seek contextual understandings of this issue. In an attempt to resolve this standing debate, the third stream of research, mostly comprising modern social theorists, has attempted to find a point of balance between the two extreme views. According to Akram (2012) and Dépelteau (2008), major contributions to this stream of research are the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Anthony Giddens (1979; 1984), and Margaret Archer (1995; 2000; 2003). To present a theoretical proposition about this dialectic, this research presents a brief analysis of relevant extant work.

Archer (1995) argues that the shifting of causal autonomy to one of the extremes (i.e., either structure or agency) is due to a defect of conflation in social theory. This defect in conflation in social theory results in either downward conflation (where causal efficacy is denied to agency and autonomy is granted to structure) or upward conflation (where causal efficacy is denied to structure and autonomy is offered to agency). Archer views structure and agency as co-constitutive (central conflation) and argues that

structure is reproduced through the exercise of agency which in itself is limited as well as enabled via structural forces. This circular relationship of structure and agency, both causing each other and being affected by one another, is referred to as reflexivity. However, in her focus on reflexivity, Archer tends to provide more autonomy to the agency which Akram (2012) argues is a return to individualist approach. Akram argues that ignoring the unconscious and habits is an over-emphasis on intentionality and neglect of critical aspects of the agency.

Archer explains her concept of central conflation in terms of analytical dualism and argues that agency and structure are ontologically distinct, instead of polar contraries, and that these relatively autonomous causal agents affect social outcomes in different ways. She offers temporality as a key explanation in outlining the interaction between agency and structure. By separating structural factors that offer a framework of action, Archer argues that it is possible to explore how these factors shape the consequent interactions of agents and how the interactions reproduce the initial context or transform it. She claims that social structures must be external to actions because they exist before the actions (Dépelteau, 2008). Time helps in understanding how pre-existing structures limit or influence agency and, consequently, how the agency can change or reproduce pre-existing structures. Archer (1995) refers to this as a morphogenetic sequence. Social processes are formed through an array of such morphogenetic sequences but, as a result of their temporal ordering, they can be separated and analysed of underlying causal dynamics. Archer's approach can be divided into four time periods starting from structural conditioning at time T_1, to socio-cultural interaction at times T_2-T_3, and finally to structural elaboration (morphogenesis) and structural reproduction (homeostasis) at T_4. By doing so, argues Archer, it is possible to understand the interactions of structure and agency over time instead of simply stating their theoretical interdependence.

Archer (2000; 2010) argues that the personal identity is distinct from social identity, and states that the personal identity has been much neglected in the structure versus agency dialectic. She postulates that the characteristics of agency that are pre-social owe their existence to the personal identity which she differentiates from the part of a human subject (the social self) that is subject to structural influences. Reflexivity, according to Archer, is the main characteristic of personal identity. Many researchers (Fleetwood, 2008; King 2010; Akram, 2012) have criticised this over-reliance on reflexivity. Akram (2012) argues that this over-reliance tends to ignore the role of habit and the unconscious, which is a key issue with Archer's approach.

The structuration theory of Giddens (1979) is also a proponent of central conflation. Philosophically similar to Archer's view, Giddens views the structure-agency relationship as an ontological duality in contrast to Archer's ontological dualism and views the interaction as internally related. Giddens' explanation of structure is internal and not external to agency; while his explanation of agency also includes an internalisation of structure in unconscious forms. However, this internalisation of structure, according to Giddens can be exercised through reflexive behaviour as well as intentional action. This conceptualisation of agency in contrast to Archer's explanation of reflexive agency provides greater significance to the agency. Unlike Archer's ontological dualism, Giddens believes structure and agency as an ontological duality and are thus internally related.

In his book, "The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration", Giddens bases the concept of agency on three fundamental parts: the discursive conscious, the practical conscious, and the unconscious. This acknowledgment of the role of the unconscious and Akram's (2012) work of incorporating the role of the unconscious in this dialectic formulate a case for understanding the role of the collective unconscious.

The understanding of agency in Giddens' work allows a better and more adequate conceptualisation of agency than Archer's approach does (Akram, 2012) in terms of the various levels of consciousness and unconsciousness. Giddens recognises the limits of agential knowledge and acknowledges that agents are not completely informed about the structural contexts inside which they are embedded and are still influenced by them. Stones (2001) recognises that using Giddens; approach, it could become possible to account for pre-reflexive routines, habits, and assumptions – actions that are visible but unnoticed even by the actors. Giddens' refusal of ontological dualism between structure and agency is a central tenet of his theory. Mouzelis (1991; 2000) has criticised Giddens and argued in favour of the ontological separation of agency and structure. Mouzelis admits that Giddens' notion of duality of agency and structure allows him to better describe how agents involve in the practice of structural rules but advises that Giddens cannot handle the second-order strategic use of rules and resources, which necessitates ontological dualism of structures from agents.

Giddens' concept of practical consciousness, which he differentiates from Archer's idea of reflexivity by distinguishing intentional and reflexive action, is close to Bourdieu's concept of habitus. Bourdieu (1977) defines habitus as "systems of durable, transposable disposition". In broad terms, it may refer to "our overall orientation to, or way of being in the world; our predisposed way of thinking, acting and moving in and through the social environment…" (Sweetman, 2003). This embodiment of a social structure in human behaviour tends to dissolve the structure-agency dichotomy. This concept is close to Giddens concept of duality due to its conceptualisation of the unconscious; although there is little mention of it in explicit terms, Bourdieu (1977) does accept that "the unconscious is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus…"

Moreover, many critics have observed the unconscious features of Bourdieu's idea of the habitus. Adams (2006) views habitus as an unconscious development. Similarly, in Adkins' (2003) view, habitus is the knowledge that is non-cognitive and cannot be explicitly expressed. Criticisms on habitus have also included commentaries on how the unconscious affects conscious thoughts and actions. While some (Elder-Vass, 2007) found it confusing how Bourdieu stressed the subconscious working of the habitus and at the same time accepted the role of conscious thinking; others (King, 2000; Jenkins, 2000) inquire how the processes of the mind are understood in the habitus theory and also how the conscious thought processes related to the unconscious mind. The commentaries and criticisms, inter alia, prove the existence of the unconscious in the operation of the habitus. Like Fleetwood, (2008), King (2010), and Stones (2001), criticise Archer's morphogenetic approach for too much reliance on reflexivity, Elder-Vass (2007) and Jenkins (2002) question regarding the balance between different aspects of agency (e.g. reflexivity; unconscious) in the habitus, and claim that Bourdieu's theory and its over-reliance on the unconscious lead to a reduction in conscious mental processes. The upcoming section of this paper addresses these concerns.

Table 1

Presents a Summary of the Similarities and Differences among the
Approaches of Archer, Giddens and Bourdieu

	Archer (1995, 2000, 2003)	Giddens (1979)	Bourdieu (1977)
Conflation Structure-Agency Interaction	– Central – Analytical dualism – (structure and agency as ontologically distinct and operating at different periods)	– Central – Analytical duality – (structure and agency as ontologically integrated)	– Central – Analytical duality – (structure and agency as ontologically integrated)
Explanatory Mechanism(s)	– Time and morphogenetic sequences – Reflexivity	– Internalisation of the structure by agents – Reflexivity – More focus on conscious intentions	– Habitus (a system of transposable actions) – Little focus on reflexivity
Assumptions	– Critical realism – Structure as a symbolic system	– Post-empiricist frame – Structure as a symbolic system	– Structure as a symbolic system

Source: Comparison of the theories of Archer, Giddens, and Bourdieu.

The crossovers, comparisons, and contrasts within the works of these three theorists are not undocumented. There are several accounts of comparisons between Giddens and Archer (e.g., King, 2010) given that both are British sociologists and contemporaries and that Archer's work is predominantly in critical assessment of Gidden's conceptualisation of central conflation. Similarly, while authors draw several comparisons between Giddens and Bourdieu, several studies attempt to reconcile Archer and Bourdieu (e.g., Elder-Vass, 2007). While these studies are worth discussing, they largely remain out of the scope of this paper. This paper attempts to critique Akram's (2012) use of the personal unconscious as means to explain the role of the unconscious mind within these theories. Hence, it uses Akram's operationalisations of the concepts (such as agency and structure) to put forward the argument that the unconscious, in this case, is closer to Jung's collective unconscious.

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

Akram (2012) argues that the unconscious is an important tenet of Giddens' structuration theory as well as of Bourdieu's habitus theory. Even though there is little mention of the unconscious in Bourdieu's work, his admirers (King, 2000; Adams, 2006) and his critics (Jenkins 2002; Elder-Vass, 2007) both acknowledge the existence of the unconscious in Bourdieu's work. However, Akram contends that despite this acknowledgment, the unconscious character of Bourdieu's work has not received much research attention. Moreover, even though the unconscious has been frequently mentioned in the structure versus agency dialectic, little work has been directed towards understanding the underlying mechanisms. The role of the unconscious in the structure versus agency debate can be studied forth to reveal interesting arenas for discussion. The

first point of discussion, in this regard, is to come up with a point of view on the nature of the unconscious itself. Is the unconscious a unified whole? Is it a single systematic view of all that is unconscious? Is it a mass of sectional views of the unconscious mind – a combination of fragments of a total experience; fragments that may or may not be related? This requires an unpacking of different views on the unconscious. Bargh and Morsella (2008) contend that although the concept of an unconscious mind is regarded by numerous psychologists as not or less "real" as compared to the conscious mind; however, substantial evidence suggests that the unconscious is not observably any less complex and action-oriented than the conscious mind. Due to this consciousness-centric bias, argue Bargh and Morsella (2008), the unconscious is mostly defined with reference to unintendedness; however, they maintain that several unconscious processes are behaviour-guiding, evaluative, perceptual, motivational, and thus agential.

Akram (2012) criticises Archer for an over-reliance on reflexivity and personal identity and argues that it makes a return to the individualistic approach and argues that along with reflexivity, the unconscious is also important in understanding this dialectic. She argues that the unconscious is a more important aspect of agency and provides greater autonomy to both agency and structure. Akram clearly states that her conceptualisation of the unconscious different from that of Freud and contends that the Freudian view of the unconscious is deterministic and implies a one-sided causality that reduces the autonomy of agents; which is an anathema to her dialectic approach where she clearly articulates that structure and agency are both independent and autonomous. She bases her understanding of the unconscious on the tenets provided by Giddens and Bourdieu; however, there is a clear lack of explanation as to how this unconscious is defined. Also, the unconscious that she uses to present her thesis is undoubtedly personal and individualistic if not downright deterministic.

We will provide a brief account of how and why we believe the Freudian unconscious to be less relevant to the subject in discussion. Freud's view of the unconscious comes from his psychoanalytic theory and the modeling of id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1961). This view of the unconscious is based on the underlying processes of the id, ego, and superego and has been perceived by researchers to be deterministically causal (Akram, 2012; Harre & Gillet, 1994). Coming from a critical realist frame of reference, any theorisation of the unconscious except for a scientific and causal one will be referred to as subjective and therefore unscientific. But removing the ontological lens of critical realism, it can be acknowledged that ontology is inaccessible in direct terms and thus humans can only know about the reality not directly access it (Bhaskar, 1975). This allows further discussion, using different paradigmatic lenses, to unpack the unconscious mind.

The Freudian unconscious is more biologically than socially determined and thus is not as relevant to an understanding of social structure. In comparison, Jung's notion of the collective unconscious is a better and more relevant approach towards understanding the unconscious with reference to the social structure because the processes underlying the collective unconscious are as social as they are or can be biological. As previously discussed, Jung (1936) argues about the possibility of different types of the unconscious. He termed the Freudian unconscious as 'personal unconscious' and argues it to be different from an unconscious that is shared by various beings of the same species; for

which he coined the term 'collective unconscious. In "The Significance of Constitution and Heredity in Psychology" (Jung, 1929), Jung differentiates the collective unconscious from repressed images and sexual fantasies that were underlying mechanisms of the Freudian unconscious and explains it as "'primordial images' or 'archetypes' that belong to the basic stock of the unconscious psyche and cannot be explained as personal acquisitions. According to Jung, the collective unconscious is comprised of elements that have been part of the unconscious of the society, and the human species at large, through time and any individual has not personally acquired these elements, and it could therefore be argued that none of these elements have ever been part of the individual's cognition or conscious. This distinction between personal and collective unconscious is useful in understanding the role of history in forming collective memory, as suggested by Ocasio et al. (2015), and applying the understanding to the structure versus agency debate.

The memory and unconscious are intricately related (Bargh & Morsella, 2008), and it also applies to collective memory and the collective unconscious. Collective memory has been defined in several ways, ranging from an act of remembrance (Boje, 2008) to a thing that can be stored, retrieved, and forgotten (Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Fine & Beim, 2007). Olick (1999) defines collective memory as "both the medium and outcome of social configurations". Here Click refers to the idea that memory is not only an act of remembrance but also lives beyond the act in the form of documents that may later be retrieved from archives and reinterpreted. Collective memory, thus, travels across time.

The collective unconscious, as defined by Jung (1936), is a portion of the psyche that is distinguishable from the personal unconscious, such that it does not come from individual experience. Its acquisition, unlike personal unconscious, is not personal. The personal unconscious is made of contents that at a certain point in time were conscious but were dropped off the conscious due to forgetting or repression. This definition of unconscious incorporates some part of the role of memory in the unconscious processes. According to Jung, the contents that the collective unconscious is made of were never personally acquired and do not owe their existence to personal experience. Thus, the contents of the collective unconscious were never a part of an individual's conscious; they come through hereditary sources.

Ocasio et al. (2012) present an account of how collective memory, in the form of historical events, outlines our understanding of social structures and institutions. They employ an institutional logic approach (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) which argues that institutional logics structure historical webs of meaning inside which organisations and organisational activities are rooted. This argument can be traced into the discussion in question, and implications can be drawn from it. Like organisations acting as entities in social systems, individual thought and behaviours too, are shaped by prevalent societal logics that in turn outline an understanding of the social structure for that individual. These societal logics, in our case, are the elements of the collective unconscious that have been provided to the individuals by society.

Before moving to a discussion of how we propose collective unconscious as a mechanism for resolving structure versus agency dialectic, it is important to conceptualise the role of history, which serves as the temporal dimension of the collection of the elements that comprise the collective unconscious. The linguistic and

cultural turn in social sciences has resulted in a rebirth of history and historical conceptualisations (Kipping & Usdiken, 2014). In this paper, history refers to an accumulation of the past and discourses and narratives attached to the events comprising this accumulation. History in this paper serves as a foreground for the collective memory-making and thus the collective unconscious, which is the main theme of this paper. Kansteiner (2002) argues that collective memory is different from history, but it is made from material that comprises history. In presenting this argument, Kansteiner maintains that collective memory is as much a consequence of unconscious absorption of history as it is of conscious manipulation.

An emphasis on the unconscious is often faced with charges of deterministic tendencies; however, Akram (2012) argues that it is not the case and maintains that an explanation of the unconscious is not necessarily a defense of determinism.

COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS AND STRUCTURE—AGENCY DIALECTIC

Akram (2012) builds a similar argument where she emphasises the role of the unconscious in the structure versus agency dialectic. She points out Archer's heavy reliance on reflexivity and ignoring of habit and unconscious and refers to it as a return to individualistic approaches. However, in her explanation of the unconscious, she uses the Freudian unconscious which is highly personal and against the argument that she previously presents. This paper contributes to the stream of literature by incorporating the collective unconscious in this dialectic as a form of the unconscious that travels through time and comes to an individual through members of his/her species. Akram argues that agents might not be able to produce reasons for several of their behaviours because a large part of social life is taken for granted in the form of routines; however, through the role of reflexivity and unconscious, we can better understand individual behaviours.

To explain the role of the unconscious in how structure shapes agency and in turn, how agents are complicit, she uses the concept of gender. Here again, the personal unconscious of Freud is not as applicable to the debate in question as to the collective unconscious. Gender, is a species-wide phenomenon and the elements comprising this unconscious acknowledgment of gender have never been part of an individual's personal conscious.

Similarly, Ocasio et al. (2015) present an understanding of how collective memory plays a role in structuring social institutions and their logics. They acknowledge the importance and efficacy of a dialectic approach. They build a model that posits that collective memory of societal events is a determinant of societal logics that govern institutional behaviour. Making a similar argument, this paper proceeds from the view of Ocasio and colleagues by moving the "collective" to a higher level of collectivity. While Ocasio et al. (2015) use society as a frame of reference for collective memory, this research uses Jung's concept of the collective unconscious that takes into account the species at large and the society as a nearer and more effective collectivity.

Jung (1936) argues that the collective unconscious is a portion of the psyche and its contents are fundamentally made of archetypes. An essential associate of the collective unconscious, the archetype, is a definite form inside the psyche that is present at all times and places. It is an omnipresent phenomenon which indispensable from the collective unconscious.

Jung (1936) presents his notion in the following words:

"*In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is thoroughly personal and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.*"

Jung (1936) argues that none of the existing views on the unconscious would deny the existence of pre-existing dispositions or instincts that common among all men and animals. Such universally distributed, impersonal, and hereditary instincts, according to Jung, form the collective unconscious; however, asserts that these instincts are not indefinite or vague. Instead, they are specific forces, motivational in nature, and exist long before any consciousness exists. Here, Jung connects the idea of these instincts to archetypes and maintains that the archetypes are the unconscious imageries of these instincts. These instincts are formed historically through the influence of structure. The motivational nature of these instincts refers to their consequent shaping of agential behaviour, thus incorporating agency to balance the dialectic.

Based on this discussion, this paper argues that the collective unconscious is as much an agential/voluntaristic concept as it is a deterministic concept; and thus, it can be proposed that:

Proposition: The collective unconscious, as an archetype of structurally shaped instincts, is a motivational force that drives agential behaviour and is an important concept in understanding the structure versus agency dialectic.

DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Akram (2012) states that the role of the unconscious does not imply the rejection of autonomy to agency. She recognises that actions are conducted by agents, and this in itself is proof that the approach is not deterministic. Similarly, the collective unconscious does not act. It is the agent who acts, and the collective unconscious affects the actions. An explanatory argument here could be that the homogeneity of the human race could be associated with structure through the role of the collective unconscious, while the heterogeneity among humans could be explained by the availability of choices that each agent has out of a pool of elements that comprise collective unconscious.

This research makes a significant contribution to organisational theory by explaining the way systems and people interact. Several key contributions can bring forth interesting research implications for future research. First, this paper adds to the institutional logic perspective and provides theoretical support for the notion that the collective unconscious provides a historical perspective that can help recursively reshape, reproduce or reconstruct memory or history. In terms of the logic perspective, Ocasio et al. (2015) have postulated societal logic as the mechanism that plays this role. However, societal logic is limited in scope and effect. Also, they lack the archetypal nature that is an essential tenet of the collective unconscious. According to Ocasio and colleagues, societal logics are formed when meta-narratives reach a certain degree of resilience,

convergence, and relevance across fields. They argue that at such a point, meta-narratives cease to behave like narratives; instead, they become common knowledge or taken-for-granted common sense descriptions. Here, they differentiate societal logics from institutional or field level logics (Thornton et al. 2012) stating that the societal level logics are rooted in collective memory not shared experience. However, the formulation of the argument lacks the multi-level approach that is required for a better conceptualisation of structure and agency.

The structure agency dialectic on its own is a multi-level debate that incorporates the individual, the communal, societal, and even the species levels. Ocasio et al. (2015) do not mention, in their work, that restricting the definition of collective memory to societal level results in a decrease in generalisability. This research tries to move a step or two further to include higher levels of collectiveness to address this concern. Jung's collective unconscious can thus be an important tool for understanding the organisation-environment relationship in terms of institutional logic and can provide a more detailed account of this research.

Second, the concept of the unconscious can also be unpacked in other ways. For example, it could be argued that certain unconscious processes are not as clear as the personal or collective unconscious. Of the many thinking processes that may be characterised as unconscious, intuition is an interesting process that might find relevance in the structure-agency debate. Intuition involves a process in which environmental stimuli (or actor ↔ ; or actor ↔ structure interactions) are matched with some profoundly held (nonconscious) category, taxonomy, or pattern. This process of matching has been theorised under several names, such as awareness (Wild, 1938), apprehension (Rorty, 1967), recognition (Simon, 1996), and seeing (Osbeck, 1999).

Based on an analysis of the extant work on intuition, Dane and Pratt (2005) define intuition as the process which is unconscious, rapid, affectively charged, and involving making holistic associations. The latter two can be used to come up with a theoretical understanding of its role in the social structure versus agency debate.

One of the crucial features of intuition is that it is nonconscious—it takes place outside of conscious thought. Jung (1933) defines intuition as a psychological function unconsciously transmitting perception. Intuition has been viewed by researchers as a process involving information processing that is different from rational and analytical processes (Dane & Pratt, 2007). The distinction between rational and non-rational can be dated back to Aristotle (Sloman, 1996). Similarly, Barnard (1938) created a taxonomy that divided thinking into logical (which can be expressed in words) and non-logical ways (which cannot be expressed in words) and attributed intuition to the non-logical category. Barnard argued that the non-logical processes might not be able to be expressed in words because they are complex as well as rapid and this instantaneity does not allow the individual to analyse the process.

According to Pacini and Epstein (1999), this nonconscious processing of information can occur at different levels of sophistication and intuiting can involve the processing of more complex information than can simple perceptions. In this connection, they observe that: "*At its lower reaches, it [the experiential system] is a relatively crude, albeit efficient, system for automatically, rapidly, and effortlessly processing information while placing minimal demands on cognitive resources. At higher reaches . . . the*

experiential system can be a source of intuitive wisdom and creativity" (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In their work on intuition, Dane and Pratt (2007) clarify the difference between the process of intuition and the outcome of intuition. Outcomes are accessible to conscious thinking, but the process through which arrives at these outcomes is not clear. In Shapiro and Spence's (1997) words, "*no awareness of the rules of knowledge used for inference.*" However, the inaccessibility of information as to how an outcome has been achieved is not synonymous with an absence of a mechanism. An understanding of the mechanisms underlying intuition and similar nonconscious processes can provide useful insights in understanding whether an individual acts in response to structural forces or are his/her actions voluntary and agential.

Third, the theoretical proposition from this paper can be used to understand the historical nature of structural effects on agential behaviour, such that the collective unconscious is understood as historically situated. Instead of considering history in the form of societal logics, like in the work of Ocasio et al.'s (2015), our model bypasses societal limits of historical specificity. Instead, we use Jung's concept of the collective unconscious, which is a broader understanding of collective memory. The inclusion of collective unconscious in this inherently sociological debate is also a significant input in terms of the triangulation of sociological and psychological approaches. A synthesis of both views is one of the major contributions of this work.

Finally, employing this research into the analysis of historical events and their consequent effects on the collective unconscious and collective memory will be an interesting addition to research literature (Schwartz, 2000). Analysis of historical records can include studying patterns of sensemaking and retrieval of historical data. This historical account can include data sources such as historical events, archives, and documents (Ocasio et al., 2015). Organisation and social scientists, as well as historians, can build upon these understandings to come up with new modes and methods, and strategies for studying the role of history. In this regard, the important idea is that an alternate account of studying history can enable social scientists to study how interpretations of events correlate with the way the events affect agential behaviour.

Implications from this research may be coupled with research on new institutionalism and institutional logics perspective to inform research (and potentially policy) on organisational systems, identities, and the interactions between individuals within organisations.

CONCLUSION

Researchers have argued that the social world should be represented "in dynamic, continuous, and processual terms" (Emirbayer 1997). Problems arise when researchers "fall into the trap of process-reduction" (Mennel 1992). This process-reduction happens when processes are transformed into "things," and when actors are detached from the social world as if they are outside the social relations. The inclusion of the collective unconscious in understanding the structure versus agency dialectic is thus an attempt to understand mechanisms underlying the structural effects on agential thought and behaviour and understanding of the social structure itself and the consequent reflexive process of responding to, changing, reproducing, or restructuring the structure itself.

By adding Jung's ideas into this debate, we have moved the analysis a step further than Akram's (2012) approach. In our opinion, the collective unconscious is a better way of understanding the effects of interactions of structure and agency upon the agent's unconscious. Unlike personal unconscious or habit, it also accounts for the historical portions of the unconscious that comprises elements that predate the agent and thus provide a better account of structure.

Our emphasis on the collective unconscious not only suggests the need for empirically understanding the role of the collective unconscious in the structure versus agency dialectic but also provides an understanding of how history and collective memory can influence the way agents to form structures and in turn respond to these structures. Agential changes in the understanding of collective memory can influence the collective unconscious, and this is how the process remains dialectic and reflexive. Future research can employ these theoretical arguments in empirical work and bring forth interesting avenues for further research.

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