Political Violence as Commitment Problem: Evidence from Balochistan, Pakistan

Existence of a social contract ensures cooperation among ethnically-diverse groups, especially when they are characterised by power asymmetries. Alternatively, constitution or any other form of social contract is meant to ensure resource and power sharing mechanisms in ethnically-diverse societies. In this regard, adherence to the commitments accentuated in the contract is Pareto superior outcome that not only prevents exploitation by the powerful group but also mitigates the risk of rebellion by the minority groups. A break-down arises when, in the presence of power asymmetries, the dominant coalition has an incentive to renege on the social contract by appropriating more than the agreed-upon share of resources. In this study, we focus on this aspect by exemplifying it with the issue of Balochistan, Pakistan, which is an important saga of deprivation and political violence. We utilise the post constitutional game-theoretic analysis of Kirstein & Voigt (1999) to establish the need for accountability for reneging on the social contract and then contextualise the framework for the case of Balochistan. We posit that while the existence of a formalised social contract in the form of a constitution is necessary, it is not sufficient for ensuring lasting peace. In other words, it is always essential to protect the constitution through ensuring accountability for violating its terms and commitments. We conclude that the recent surge in political violence in Balochistan highlights the urgent need for the country’s leadership to implement the 18th Constitutional Amendment, address Baloch grievances, and ensure that initiatives like the Peaceful Balochistan Programme to prevent civil conflict and uphold constitutional rights.

1. Introduction

Violence is undesirable in all of its forms but the potential scope and scale of political violence can be particularly detrimental to national prosperity and development. It is generally believed that political violence takes place in an environment of relative deprivation (Waker & Pettigrew, 1984) and mistrust (Murer, 2018; Muller & Rauh, 2018). Deprivation and mistrust mostly arise due to frictions in resource and power sharing mechanisms. Most of the modern nations have worked towards developing and formalising a social contract for power and resource distribution. One method they employed was to arrive at a consensus regarding terms for cooperation and maintenance of peace, achieved through formulating and documenting a ‘constitution’ that represents ‘general will’ (Rousseau, 1762). A constitution, as a legal document, formalises the general will by defining the structure of government, and elaborating the rights and responsibilities of citisens. It can play the role of a peace accord (Saad & Jacob, 2012). It can also be instrumental in replacing violent means of resolving conflict with political ones. That can achieved through provisions to regulate access to power and resources (Samuels, 2006). However, if such provisions are either not framed or not implemented, then the possibility of political violence increases. In majority of the cases, the constitutional provisions are there in the constitution but they are not implemented in their true spirit, resulting in the emergence of ‘commitment problem’. This situation is often framed within the context of a social contract, where the ruling coalition is expected to uphold promises made to the minority groups, as initially agreed upon in the constitution (Fearon, 1995; North, et al. 2009). Rousseau’s theory of the social contract (1762) posits that people in society form a collective agreement with the state, surrendering certain freedoms in exchange for protection and security. The social contract, therefore, can be considered a moral and political commitment by the state to act in the well-being of its citisens. If this commitment is broken, the state risks losing its legitimacy, which can escalate into violence. The prevalence of political violence, in any society, demonstrates that there persists a commitment problem (Fearon, 1995). This means that despite cooperation being a Pareto superior strategy, parties involved are unlikely to cooperate, without some way of making the commitments credible.

We posit that, in the presence of power asymmetries, the dominant coalition will have an incentive to renege from the social contract[1] (formalised in the constitution of the country) by appropriating more than the agreed-upon share of resources (Acemoglu, 2003). This breach undermines constitutional legitimacy as a binding pact (Rousseau, 1762; Locke, 1689) and, thus, can be potentially violence-inducing. In this paper, we argue that violating the terms of constitution by the group in power comes at a cost in terms of loss of goodwill and political support, emergence of opportunist opposition parties, judicial accountability, and need for redirecting resources towards damage control and image building. This cost would occur even if violence does not take place. The magnitude of this cost determines whether the majority or incumbent group will honor its commitment or not. A high enough cost of reneging can be violence inhibiting by making exploitation unprofitable. From the perspective of the group outside the dominant coalition, the choice remains to decide on the effort exerted towards production or engage in rebellion. A high effort implies higher levels of investment and labor force participation but carries opportunity costs. In contrast, the choice of rebellion depends on the level of exploitation or appropriation (resource deprivation), on one hand, and the costs of rebellion, on the other. The costs of rebellion include actual resources allocated to rebellion, human losses in case of conflict, and the potential adverse implications in case of a loss in rebellion. We hypothesise that, at lower levels of exploitation, the minority group will choose not to rebel. However, there is always a critical level of exploitation at (or above) which the group will opt for the gamble of rebellion. In order to explain this phenomenon, we use the post-constitutional game proposed by Kirstein & Voigt (1999) as our take-off point. We make changes to the parameters of that proposed game in order to make it represent the situation on ground. Against this theoretical backdrop, our study

The main objective of work is to examine how commitment problems manifest in the presence of constitutional arrangements, particularly in societies with power asymmetries leading to political violence and inhibit economic development. We seek to understand the conditions under which dominant groups choose to honor or renege on the social contract, and how the costs associated with reneging and rebellion influence these choices. By developing a theoretical framework and applying it to the case of Balochistan in Pakistan, we address the following key research questions: (i) under what conditions does the dominant group uphold or violate constitutional commitments? (ii) how do the costs of reneging and rebellion affect the likelihood of political violence? and (iii) in what ways do constitutional structures shape the bargaining power and responses of marginalised groups?

Pakistan’s inception in 1947 has been an outcome of unification of a number of different ethnicities under the banner of common religion i.e. Islam and the implicit understanding that the exploitation faced under the British rule as well as prospects of the exploitation under a Hindu majority in the subcontinent in post-British scenario could be prevented in a Muslim majority state. This signifies an implicit social contract between the powerful Punjabi ethnicity and the rest of smaller ethnicities. As Fearon (1995) explains such a contract entails a commitment by the elite offering empowerment and protection from exploitation to the minority group. Therefore, an effective strategy in Pakistan could have been an institutional setup that could give bargaining power to the minority groups, on one hand, and hold the powerful elite to their commitments effectively, on the other. However, the early institutional arrangements gave the center immense powers over both the tangible and intangible resources, inducing the powerful Punjabi elite to become unwilling to cede and devolve the political power structure. This real relative deprivation has been, at times, exploited by domestic regional political leadership and external vested interests, to mount rebellion and secession movements. In case of Pakistan, the costs of violence have been significant for all parties involved. We posit that ethnic violence in Pakistan is not an outcome of primordial animosity among the various ethnic groups but a case of failed bargaining.

Social contract (formalised and spelled out in the Constitution) implies that the groups outside the state would provide the necessary innovations, investments, and manpower to ensure economic activities while the state would be responsible for providing security from physical harm and exploitation in return of an agreed upon level of taxation and control. Keeping this presumption in background, we elaborate on the state of ethnic strife in Pakistan in a game theoretic perspective in order to explain the incidences of political violence and lower levels of economic development in the country. By employing a post-constitutional model, we want to make a case for consociational democracy and equality of economic opportunities as is framed in the constitution of Pakistan.