Responsible and Scalable Agricultural Drone Adoption in Pakistan: A CPEC 2.0 Pilot-to-Scale Pathway
Executive Summary
While agricultural drones have the potential to be useful in areas such as crop scouting, pesticide application, seeding, and field mapping, they cannot solve the fundamental problems of low productivity in agriculture in Pakistan. Although, agriculture accounts for 23.4 percent of GDP and employs a substantial share of Pakistan’s labour force, productivity outcomes are influenced by a broader range of factors, such as water management, seed quality, extension services, market incentives, climate risks, and access to finance, to name a few. Despite these factors, agricultural drones have increasingly been discussed in Pakistan in the context of modernizing agriculture, especially due to their potential to automate tasks that require a lot of time, reduce exposure of farmers to agricultural chemicals, and provide more precise and targeted farm management. In line with this, there is a need for a sound drone policy that focuses only on certain tasks on the farm where there is a clear business case, rather than on structural constraints such as water management, seed quality, extension services, market access, climate risks, and access to finance, which drones cannot directly address. The experience in China suggests that in some cases, such as pesticide spraying and crop management increased revenues and labor savings are possible, while other research identifies significant trade-offs, including increased spraying frequency and the need for stricter operational controls. All this evidence suggests a service-based and well-regulated approach, not based on broad assumptions or blanket subsidies, is the more effective and sustainable solution. This policy view is a 24-month, independently assessed course of action embedded within the current framework of agriculture cooperation under CPEC, but which deliberately avoids making any immediate and massive deployment recommendations. The proposed pathway would start with a single-window agricultural UAS protocol, including pilot projects that are competitive, with drone-as-a-service for small farmers and with clear operational, safety, and data-governance standards. Scale-up would only happen once predetermined thresholds that cover economic viability, compliance, safety, environmental impact and inclusion are achieved. In such a design, CPEC 2.0 can provide technology partnership, testing, training, maintenance, research collaboration, and private sector involvement, while the federal and provincial governments will remain responsible for regulation and implementation.
1. Introduction
Pakistan’s agricultural productivity is constrained by poor water management, weak extension services, poor quality of inputs, climate vulnerability, and value chain development, which are further limiting the country’s agricultural productivity. Concurrently, agricultural drones are becoming part of the broader policy and technology discussion on agricultural development, especially as countries pursue precision agriculture, automation, and digital farm services. In this context, drones are important not only for their ability to solve structural problems in agriculture, but also because they can reinforce specific operations, such as crop monitoring, mapping, and targeted application of agricultural inputs. The real question is therefore not why Pakistan should embrace agricultural drones per se, but where they can create a tangible impact, within what regulatory framework, and via what business model can they be scaled up on a sustainable basis.
The lessons learned from other nations like China are useful to consider both the possibilities and challenges of agricultural drones. In some cases, impact and empirical studies have shown improvements in farm revenues, labour savings, operating efficiency, and decreased exposure to pesticides. However, the results are not consistently favourable: spending on pesticides does not always drop and the frequency of pesticide use does not always decline; in some situations, spraying can actually increase; and the effects vary according to the type of crop, the nature of the farm, the quality of services provided, the timing of the spray, and the local conditions under which the service is delivered. Combined, these results indicate that the argument for adoption must be evaluated on a task-by-task basis and cannot be taken for granted in the absence of local experience. In this context, CPEC 2.0 can be used for purpose of technology transfer, collaborative research, technical training, demonstration projects, standards and selected industry partnerships. The goal should not be to purchase big equipment but to test commercially viable applications in Pakistan, put in place safeguards, and create markets of competitive services. Scale should hence, be based on evidence, and not technology goals.
2. Policy Problem and Analytical Scope
Pakistan’s agricultural performance is held back by a set of interlocking failures rather than any single technology gap. These consist of weak linkages to extension and research, poor water supply, inadequately targeted and inefficient support, poor availability of quality inputs, fragmented service markets, increased climate exposure, and underdeveloped value chains. There are also constraints on the demand side: farmers may have limited or no awareness of how digital and technology-based tools can be applied to agriculture, and thereby traditional farming practices will likely persist without awareness of benefits, risks, or operating conditions connected to new technologies. Practical awareness and extension support should thus be given special attention as a policy response, along with technical trainings, because the introduction of technology alone cannot ensure its effective adoption and sustained use by farmers. The World Bank notes that agriculture growth in Pakistan slowed from an average of over 4 percent per year between 1970 and 2000 to below 3 percent thereafter. It further notes that poorly functioning agricultural markets, significant policy interventions, and inefficient and poorly targeted agricultural subsidies have discouraged a shift towards more water-efficient and higher-value agriculture[1]. This is not an all-inclusive solution for using agricultural drones, but just one component of a precision farming system that enables multiple applications. Drones can be divided into two groups of uses. The sensing applications for instance imaging, crop scouting and field mapping are mostly related to the generation of information. Intervention applications like spraying, nutrient application and seeding take it one step further and add other aviation, chemical, environmental and liability risks along with it. In both cases, the information produced is only useful if it can be utilized to make farm management decisions.
The ultimate aim is to enable agricultural drone services that can be demonstrated to improve agricultural operations and/or outcomes. Imports, subsidies, and drone assembly should not be used as indicators of success, but rather as indicators of farmer and sector outcomes.
3. What the International Evidence Shows
China has a lot of small farms, fast-growing service industries, and a lot of plant protection drone use. But in any place, there is no single productivity measure. The results will vary depending on the size of the farm, type of crop, pest problems, quality of the services rendered, timing, terrain, weather, chemicals used, and the way things were done previously.
Quan et al. (2023) created a service model for local cost-benefit testing and aggregation. The authors analysed over 2,000 grain farmers from 11 provinces in China. Their findings revealed additional farm revenue of approximately US$ 434-488/hectare with labor savings of 14.4-15.8 hours/hectare when drones were used. There were no significant effects on pesticide cost or pesticide application frequency, and results were variable across farms. The results also demonstrated the potential for using drones as a service to increase efficiency. The study recommended that Pakistan should carry out a cost-benefit analysis and localize the grouping of services instead of blindly following the results of China.
In their study, Zhang et al. (2026) found that Chinese maize farmers incurred less than 29 percent of the non-pesticide operating costs when using drones for plant protection and spent 90 percent less time handling pesticides. But farmers were applying 33% more times, and there was no reduction in spending per application. Yield losses were also decreased by 4.6 percent. Overall, superior timing can mean better pest control and safety without necessarily reducing the amount of chemicals used.
Institutional factors also play an important role in adoption. Chen et al. (2020) found out that cooperatives and collective purchasing/service contracts are crucial. For example, farm size, cooperative membership, and information regarding the benefits positively impact the willingness to use drones in Jilin Province. Several farmers also chose to purchase drones as a group or via a farmer organization.
Finally, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO’s) global review also says that automation needs a solid business case, good infrastructure, skills, and inclusive service models. It reminds to provide subsidies and use technology responsibly, particularly for small farmers, women, and youth (FAO, 2022)[2].
3.1 Environmental and Operational Evidence
Precision application in drone-based spraying refers to the targeted application of pesticides at the required location, dose, and timings, while minimising unnecessary applications to non-target areas. However, precision application does not automatically ensure uniform or effective spraying. Spray performance will vary according to nozzle type, droplet size, rotor airflow, altitude, speed, canopy structure and weather conditions. Consequently, inconsistent spray coverage, inappropriate operating parameters, and lack of application uniformity remain important operational challenges (Qin and Chen, 2023). Local no-spray rules and residue checks are important because field studies indicate that buffer zones, windbreaks, and approved products can help to minimize residues on nearby crops (Kim et al., 2023). Aerial pesticide applications should be done in accordance with the minimum standard set by FAO and World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, benefits should be reported by crop, task, season, and comparison method. While adopting the national yield multiplier, Pakistan should wait until local trials are conducted to demonstrate its effectiveness.
4. Three Immediate Policy Priorities
4.1. Create a One-Stop Agricultural Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Framework
Create a single protocol for operating UASs across the agricultural sector, as the use of UASs in agriculture spans aviation, pesticide management, security, and provincial agriculture needs. A single-window framework would not supersede the requirements of these institutions but would give one consolidated approval and compliance interface to the applicants and leave it to each competent authority to take its own substantive decision. The protocol should clarify the difference between imaging and payload-release operations, include a common application checklist, identify which authority will approve each requirement, have clear service timelines, and establish pre-season approval procedures for validated, low-risk operations. This would eliminate unnecessary duplication and ambiguity in approvals and maintain sector-specific protections. This priority is not about the centralization of regulatory power, but about administrative coordination and regulatory clarity.
4.2. Develop a Competitive Drone-as-a-Service Market
Drone-as-a-service models have to be prioritized for smallholders as they would otherwise be responsible for acquiring the expensive equipment, operating, maintaining, and periodically upgrading it. If the service providers are of good quality, they are the ones who are competing for business, allowing farmers to access the technology when they need it and the provider is incentivized to make better use of it, maintain it and deliver better service. If affordability is truly an issue during pilot, service vouchers or co-financing may be used to help overcome the affordability barrier. Local assembly and equipment subsidies, on the other hand, should be deferred until there is clear evidence of utilization, demand, service quality, and commercial viability. The reasoning is very simple: before public funding is dedicated to owning and operating the drone, it needs to demonstrate that it is addresses a legitimate farm-service need.
4.3. Build Capability, Data Governance and Inclusive Access
Building modular capability, strong governance of data and technology, and accessible access is critical to ensure adoption is not hampered by a lack of skilled staff and farmers’ apprehensions on data and technology utilization. The responsibilities of the pilots, agricultural applicators, technicians and data analysts should clearly be separated. Extension services and co-operatives should, in turn, fill the farmers with practical awareness of what drones can and cannot do, how services can be acquired, what information the farmers should be provided, and what precautions should be taken for their safety. Likewise, it is important that there are clear standards for farmer consent, data security, access rights, retention, portability, and interoperable data management. Monitoring participation by smallholders, tenant farmers, women, youth, and other unserved populations should also be done to ensure the system reaches those who need it most. The basic premise is that no matter how technically sophisticated the drone system, if users are unaware, operators aren’t skilled, or farmers cannot meaningfully control their own data, then the system cannot scale.
5. A CPEC 2.0 Delivery Model for Agricultural Drones
CPEC already has an institutional basis for agricultural cooperation. The dedicated Joint Working Group (JWG) identifies capacity building, agricultural technology extension, processing, market information, and broader agricultural development as priority areas. This architecture can be incorporated with agricultural drones, which can then be viewed as a means of cooperation that can be regulated, implemented, and evaluated by Pakistani institutions.
Therefore, the suggested approach is to establish a “CPEC Agricultural Drone Pilot and Standards Program (CPEC-ADPSP)” through the agricultural cooperation mechanism and competent institutions in Pakistan. The program aims to conduct trials to identify potential areas of agricultural drone services to increase productivity, safety, and service efficiency in the context of Pakistan-China cooperation. There should also be no policy restrictions on participation by qualified Chinese and Pakistani companies.